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Abstract
This paper o⁄ers evidence on the design of subprime mortgages as bridge-￿nancing
products. We show that the viability of subprime mortgages was uniquely predicated
on the appreciation of house prices over short-horizons. High rates of early prepayments
on subprime mortgages are suggestive of the use of prepayments as an exit option. This
paper argues that high early defaults on post-2004 originations can be explained when
one considers high early prepayment rates for pre-2004 originations.
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11 Introduction
The collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market is one of the landmark events in recent
￿nancial history. Existing research has concentrated e⁄orts on the centrality of securiti-
zation and the role of underwriting in explaining the demise of the subprime mortgage
market.1 However, not much is known about the rationale behind the design and origi-
nation of subprime mortgages. The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the
uniqueness of subprime mortgage design, especially as a means of "bridge ￿nancing" or
credit accommodation. Our aim is to explain the boom and bust in the subprime mort-
gage market in light of the evidence from loan-level data on subprime mortgage contracts.
Subprime lending contracts were meant to provide mortgage ￿nancing for borrowers
who would otherwise be denied prime avenues of conventional ￿nance. Given the high
risk associated with lending to such borrowers, most lenders prefer to be exposed to such
risk over short horizons only. Subprime mortgages attempted to resolve these issues by
forming a credit accommodation product over short horizons (Gorton, 2008). The proposed
solution was to exploit the capital gains from house price appreciation over short horizons
for mutual bene￿t of borrowers and lenders. The borrower bene￿ts from temporary credit
accommodation, and the monthly payments over a period of rising house prices allow
borrowers to build up equity in their homes. Ceteris paribus, the borrower becomes less
risky for subsequent mortgages. In short, subprime mortgages were designed to be rolled
over and each time the horizon was deliberately kept short to limit the lender￿ s exposure
to such high-risk borrowers.
We begin by presenting ￿ve pieces of evidence on subprime originations. First, over
70% of subprime originations for each cohort (year of origination) are re￿nances of ex-
isting mortgages. Second, a growing and signi￿cant majority of these originations were
hybrid-ARM products designed to reset into a fully indexed rate after two or three years.2
Signi￿cantly, this reset is designed to be a step-up (but hardly ever a step down), so as to
increase the payment burden and essentially force a re￿nancing of the loan. Third, most
subprime originations included prepayment penalties with the penalty term expiring no
sooner than the reset date on the hybrid-ARM.3 Fourth, contrary to conventional wisdom,
1For details on the literature on subprime mortgages, see GAO (2010).
2A hybrid-ARM product includes an initial ￿xed-rate mortgage (FRM) at a teaser rate typically for a
period of two or three years. It then shifts from the ￿xed payment schedule at a pre-speci￿ed reset date to a
rate equal to a speci￿ed index (like LIBOR) plus a margin, just like any ordinary adjustable rate mortgage
(ARM).
3This meant that the contract ensured that the penalty would be in e⁄ect at least as long as the borrower
2teaser rates on hybrid-ARMs were not low when compared with those available on other
mortgage products￿ prompting the borrower to seek re￿nancing at the earliest opportu-
nity. In short, the mortgage was designed to ensure that subprime borrowers continue to
make monthly payments at the high closing rates before they could re￿nance into another
mortgage. Finally, most defaults on subprime mortgages, especially those originated in
years 2006 and 2007 occur early￿ within the ￿rst two years of origination.4 Consequently,
much of the attention in this paper is focused on explaining such high early defaults.5
We demonstrate that such high early defaults on post-2004 originations can be ex-
plained when one considers high early prepayment rates of pre-2004 originations.6 We
￿nd high prepayment rates for subprime mortgages especially for pre-2004 originations.
Signi￿cantly, high prepayment rates for subprime mortgages are hardly surprising because
re￿nancing was an integral part of the mortgage design. What is surprising is that (1) these
prepayments occur early in the life of the mortgage and that (2) low interest rates have
not always been the motivation behind prepayments (re￿nances) in the subprime market.
First, it is important to recall that building up home equity is critical to the success of
subprime mortgage design. Subprime lenders used prepayment penalties to postpone this
eventuality in an e⁄ort to build up home equity for the borrower. However, in spite of
prepayment penalties, we ￿nd that a signi￿cant proportion of subprime borrowers prepaid
early. Second, the notable examples of high early prepayment are hybrid-ARM products
originated in 2003, a year of historically low interest rates. As much as 83% of surviving
hybrid-ARMs originated in 2003 were prepaid by the end of 2007.7 The corresponding
percentage for FRMs is 63%. Signi￿cantly, these numbers suggest not only high early pre-
payment rates on all product types but also that the low-interest-rate environment around
2003-2004 did not play a large role in the prepayment behavior of subprime mortgages.
was required to pay the teaser rate on the hybrid-ARM.
4For the purposes of this study, a mortgage is de￿ned to be in default if it records a 90-day delinquency
event (Cowan and Cowan, 2004). Alternative de￿nitions of default, like 60-day delinquency or foreclosure,
yield qualitatively similar results.
5The high early default rates on originations of 2006 and 2007 (which were yet to reset) have ruled out
rate resets as a cause of the debacle.
6A mortgage is said to be prepaid in the event that the property is sold o⁄ or the original loan is
re￿nanced. It is important to mention that most comprehensive databases, and consequently most empirical
work on mortgages, typically do not distinguish between the two modes of prepayment.
7Presumably, some of these prepayments were re￿nances and, if so, they are likely to have re￿nanced
into higher mortgage rates post-2004. The 6-month LIBOR (the index rate on over 80 percent of subprime
ARMs) during 2003 ranged from a high of 1.37 percent in January 2003 and low of 1.08 percent in June
2003. The LIBOR increased steadily from 1.16 percent in March 2004 to 5.35 percent in September 2007.
3Such high and early prepayments are suggestive of the use of prepayments as exit
options by distressed borrowers. Post-delinquency, prepayment can be used as an exit
option, presumably as a means to avoid foreclosure. In addition, this option can also
be used before the borrower becomes delinquent on the mortgage as a means to avoid
delinquency. We ￿nd compelling evidence on both counts. First, among the originations
that register a 30-day (or a 60-day) delinquency within the ￿rst two calendar years, the
proportion of mortgages that are subsequently either paid o⁄ or go into foreclosure is
noticeably high but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent across cohorts. Second, the proportion of
originations that either register a 30-day delinquency within the ￿rst 18 months or are non-
delinquent and prepaid within that period is also high but again not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
across cohorts.
Remarkably, while these early payment patterns do not change across cohorts, their
composition does. Our results clearly show a pattern of high early prepayment rates on
subprime mortgages for earlier cohorts and a sharp drop in these early prepayment rates for
originations of later cohorts, especially during 2006-2007. Needless to say, the sharp drop in
early prepayment rates is accompanied by a sharp increase in delinquency rates. Likewise,
a sharp decline in post-delinquency prepayment rates during 2006-2007 has led to a sharp
rise in the foreclosure rate. This result is robust across the di⁄erent categories of occupancy,
product type, and loan purpose. Moreover, the result holds regardless of whether we track
originations over a given loan age or particular calendar dates and whether we consider
post-delinquency or pre-delinquency behavior.
In light of this evidence, the paper demonstrates the centrality of economic conditions,
especially house price growth, as drivers of payment patterns on subprime mortgages. We
use a competing-risk hazard model to demonstrate how house price growth since origi-
nation and its interaction with credit variables in￿ uence prepayment and default hazards
on subprime mortgages. For example, among subprime originations in the highest credit
score quartile, the default hazard on those with low and negative house price growth can
vary between 18 and 25 times the default hazard on those with above-median changes in
house price growth since origination. Correspondingly, the prepayment hazard for those
with low and negative house price growth can vary between 0.26 and 0.38 times the de-
fault hazard on those with above-median changes in house price growth since origination.
More generally, our results con￿rm that even among borrowers of similar credit quality,
those originations that experience low or even negative house price growth have drastically
higher default and lower prepayment hazards in comparison with those originations that
4experienced high house price growth.
From the point of view of our analysis of mortgage design and at least from the per-
spective of individual lenders and borrowers entering into subprime contracts, house price
patterns have been treated as exogenous. In this regard, we are motivated largely by Shiller
(2008), who argues that the most important single element in the house price boom is, as
he puts it, the social contagion of boom thinking.8 He argues (p.48):
Other factors are widely cited as the cause of the housing boom.... to a large
extent, these other factors are themselves substantially a product of the bubble,
and not exogenous factors that caused the bubble.
As is well known, there was a strong and persistent appreciation in house prices in
almost all U.S. metropolitan areas from 1995 to 2006, followed by a sharp downturn (see
Figure 1).9 In a regime of rising house prices, borrowers can avoid default by prepaying
their loans (either through a re￿nance or a property sale). Moreover, if the house price
appreciation is su¢ ciently large, a borrower can recover the costs of re￿nancing and even
choose to extract equity. However, this option is no longer available when prices do not
appreciate. Consequently, borrower defaults began to increase sharply in 2006, when house
prices ceased to appreciate.
Recent work has attempted to explain defaults in subprime mortgages as occurring
because of lax underwriting. The dominant explanation for the subprime crisis has been
that securitization led to a severe weakening in underwriting standards over the past few
years, eventually causing a downturn in this market (Dell￿ Arricia et al. 2008; Demyanyk
and Van Hemert, 2009; Keys et al. 2009). However, evidence on lax underwriting for
subprime mortgages due to the originate-to-distribute channel has been mixed (Bhardwaj
and Sengupta, 2009; Elul, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2011). This paper departs from this debate
and proposes an alternative hypothesis for the boom and bust in the subprime mortgage
market.
Earlier work has alluded to the prepayment hypothesis presented in this paper (Cutts
and van Order, 2005 and Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet, 2007). It is well estab-
lished that subprime borrowers face signi￿cant liquidity constraints (Adams et al. 2009).
8Gimeno and Mart￿nez-Carrascal (2010) provide macroeconomic evidence in support of this e⁄ect using
Spanish data. For a more general equilibrium treatment of house price determination in this environment,
see Hott (2011).
9The date for the peak on housing prices and the extent of the fall in home prices varies depending on
the home-price index used (Aubuchon and Wheelock, 2008).
5While this can imply that prepayment rates on subprime mortgages are higher than prime
mortgages, these rates are relatively less sensitive to cyclical movements in the interest rate
(Cutts and Van Order, 2005). Hurst and Sta⁄ord (2003) ￿nd that families experiencing a
negative income shock or those that are severely liquidity constrained are 25% more likely
to re￿nance than otherwise similar households. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that
some households extract equity even in times of rising interest rates, primarily with the
motive of consumption-smoothing (Stanton, 1995; Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson, 2002).
For more than a decade, increased ￿nancial awareness, lender competition, ￿nancial in-
novations, and structural changes in the mortgage market have signi￿cantly increased a
household￿ s ability to re￿nance a mortgage at very low costs (Bennett, Peach, and Persi-
tiani, 2001).10 However, it is important to note that a decrease in property values makes
it di¢ cult for households to re￿nance mortgages and take advantage of declining interest
rates (Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy, 1997).
Section 2 presents a timeline on subprime lending that provides a brief overview from
its origins to its current state. Section 3 provides the summary evidence on the unique
design on subprime mortgages and their reliance on house price appreciation. In Section
4, we provide detailed evidence on a high rate of prepayments and the heavy use of early
prepayments as exit options in the subprime market. Section 5 provides details on the
estimation and results and Section 6 concludes.
2 A Timeline on Subprime Lending
2.1 De￿nition of Subprime and Data Sources
As a starting point of this analysis, we note that there is no universally accepted de￿nition
of subprime lending. Some studies have de￿ned subprime lending in terms of borrowers,
thereby classifying all loans originated to borrowers of ￿poor credit quality￿as subprime
loans. Operationally, any de￿nition of ￿poor credit quality￿involves selecting borrowers
on the basis of credit history or alternatively some threshold credit score. However, this
de￿nition does not capture the fact that many borrowers with good credit history (scores)
also made use of the subprime market. Alternatively, the de￿nition on subprime can
be based on lenders, thereby classifying all loans originated from a particular lender as
10Figure 2 illustrates the decline in one component of transactions cost￿ namely, points and fees levied
as a proportion of the conventional loan amount. These costs declined from 2.5 percent in 1983 to roughly
0.4 percent in 2006.
6subprime. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has maintained a
list of predominantly subprime lenders since 1993.11 These lenders are known to specialize
in the origination of subprime loans with high fees and interest rates. However, it is also
true that the same lenders made loans to prime borrowers. More important, using this
de￿nition omits a signi￿cantly large number of subprime loans that were originated by
prime lenders.
A third de￿nition classi￿es all loans packaged into a subprime MBS as subprime mort-
gages. Like most other segments of the U.S. mortgage market (namely, Agency, Jumbo,
and Alt-A), this de￿nition classi￿es the loan according to the credit enhancement required
in the secondary market. More importantly, it is based on a market-used classi￿cation as
opposed to ad hoc criteria based on lender or borrower characteristics. In what follows,
this study uses the third MBS de￿nition of subprime.
Our principal data source is the ABS Database from the Corelogic-LoanPerformance
(hereafter, LP) data repository containing loan-level data on securitized mortgages.12 This
is the largest and the most comprehensive mortgage securities data repository for non-
prime mortgages. We restrict our analysis to loan-level data on over nine million ￿rst-lien
securitized subprime mortgages originated between 1998 and 2006.
2.2 Early Years
Using the MBS de￿nition of subprime has one obvious limitation. Given that the wide-
spread securitization of subprime mortgages is a fairly recent phenomenon, this de￿nition
of subprime fails to include non-prime mortgages originated in the pre-securitization era.
However, it is important to emphasize that subprime mortgages are not a recent phenom-
enon and were in existence before their rapid growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
In the years following the Great Depression, e⁄orts were made to standardize existing
mortgages into a long-term (20 years), ￿xed-rate, level-payment, self-amortizing mort-
gage (see Green and Wachter, 2005, for details). The dominant position of the standard
mortgage developed under the auspices of the federal government, speci￿cally the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), which was created in 1934 to insure and thereby enhance
the liquidity of such home mortgages (Quigley, 2006). In an e⁄ort to stimulate hous-
ing construction during the postwar years, the FHA signi￿cantly liberalized its terms for
11See http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/manu.html for details.
12Details on this database￿ its evolution, coverage, and comparison with other mortgage databases￿ are
available in GAO (2010).
7providing insurance.13 By so doing, the FHA created the ￿rst non-traditional mortgages
(NTMs)￿ the precursor to modern day subprime mortgages (Pinto, 2010).
2.3 Origins of Subprime
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) argue that the growth of NTMs into non-
prime products is largely due to a sustained period of deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s,
which a⁄ected both demand and supply of mortgage ￿nance. First, the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), adopted in 1980, extended
the favorable variable rate ceiling to all lenders and thereby preempted all state usury
ceilings for ￿rst-lien loans. As a result, lenders who wanted to charge higher rates had
new incentives to re￿nance ￿rst mortgages, rather than to o⁄er junior-lien mortgages that
were subject to state usury laws. In e⁄ect this law helped create the most common type
of subprime loans￿ namely, re￿nances of ￿rst-lien mortgages. Next, the Alternative Mort-
gage Transaction Parity Act (AMPTA) of 1982 permitted the use of variable interest rates
and balloon payments, thereby overriding many state laws that prevented the use of non-
conventional mortgages. Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased the demand for
mortgage debt because it prohibited the deduction of interest on consumer loans, yet al-
lowed interest deductions on mortgages for a primary residence as well as one additional
home (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006). According to the authors (p. 38), it
￿made even high-cost mortgage debt cheaper than consumer debt for many homeowners,￿
thereby facilitating debt consolidation. Each of the three laws above contributed to the
growth of non-prime lending in the form of cash-out re￿nances as a means of consolidation
of other (more expensive) consumer debt.
During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the dominant non-conforming loan origina-
tors were savings and loan institutions, whose traditional business was originating 30-year
￿xed-rate mortgages funded by retail deposits and other short-term ￿nancing. Bruskin et
al. (2000) observe that the vast majority of non-conforming mortgages were traded as un-
securitized ￿whole loans.￿Sellers in this market were typically unrated or non-investment-
grade entities that also serviced these loans and retained the subordinated interest. They
argue that two pieces of legislation in the mid-1980s provided a signi￿cant boost for the
13These e⁄orts raised the maximum term of the mortgage to 30 years and also raised the loan-to-value
ratio to 95 percent (from the initial maximum of 80 percent). With time, the share of FHA loans dwindled
due to loan size caps and private mortgage insurers (PMIs) started taking their place.
8non-agency MBS market.14 The issuers in this market included mortgage lenders and con-
duit operations, large originators of non-conforming loans, and banks and thrifts as well.
It was around this time that issuers began to sell the subordinated classes of securities
that were earlier retained by the originator. These subordinated classes of securities were
unrated and conservatively priced because investors had little historical data to enable
pricing to risk.
Non-agency MBS issuance grew from 3% of all MBS in 1986 to 16% in 1992. Annual
issuance quadrupled between 1990 and 1993 but declined thereafter as re￿nancing activity
dried up as a result of a rise in interest rates. This led originators to broaden their base
to subprime segments and use specialized programs involving high LTV loans (informally
referred to as ￿125￿ s).15 The growth of this subprime segment su⁄ered from the sovereign
debt crises around 1997-1998. Pullback from those investing in such securities dried up
￿nancing for lenders who relied on securitization to ￿nance their lending operations; these
conditions severly a⁄ected originations of subprime mortgages. In summary, it is clear that
many of the events of the current subprime crises were witnessed before, albeit on a much
smaller scale and with lesser impact.
2.4 Mortgage Products and Securitization
A concurrent development to the growth of subprime mortgages was the increasing popular-
ity of hybrid-ARM mortgages. These products were developed in the 1980s and originally
structured for Jumbo mortgages. Over time and with the development of the 3/1, 5/1, and
7/1 hybrid varieties, hybrid-ARM products grew in popularity not only for jumbo but for
the agency market as well.16 However, product securitization of hybrid-ARMs was slow
to develop. Most accounts put the development of hybrid-ARM securitization in the late
1990s.17 Hybrids have used a variety of indices. The one-year current maturity Treasury
14These include the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (1984), which allowed for shelf-
registration of non-agency MBS, and the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit Legislation of 1987,
which allowed subordination as a credit enhancement technique for any type of mortgage. Most of the
discussion here follows Bruskin et al. (2000).
15As the name suggests, such loans are partially unsecured consumer loans with a LTV ratio of 125%.
Naturally, these were typically o⁄ered to borrowers of good credit quality with rates of roughly 500 to 600
basis points above conforming mortgages. For more details, see Bruskin et al. (2000).
16A ￿3/1￿ implies a teaser (￿xed) rate for the ￿rst three years of the mortgage and subsequently, an
ARM loan that resets every year.
17As Bhattacharya et al. (2005, p. 260) point out, "Conforming hybrid-ARM issuance was $128 billion in
the ￿rst nine months of 2004 which represented about 27.5% of 30-year ￿xed rate issuance. In contrast, in
1998, issuance of hybrid ARMs was only 1.7% of 30-year ￿xed rate issuance. Jumbo hybrid ARMs exhibited
9(CMT) yield was the predominant index of choice before 2001. However, the discontinua-
tion of the one-year Treasury bill brought LIBOR-indexed hybrids into prominence. An-
other reason for LIBOR-indexed hybrids was securitization, since LIBOR naturally appeals
to many institutional investors. As a result, the LIBOR-indexed hybrids were non-existent
at the end of 2000 but prominent by 2002 (Westho⁄ and Srinivasan, 2006). This is true
for both prime and non-prime products.
Securitization of subprime hybrid-ARMs also grew around this period. It is impor-
tant to note that the development of the hybrid-ARM product in general was not unique
to subprime mortgages. Using data from various sources, we observe that hybrid-ARM
products in subprime were also not con￿ned to securitized products alone. These data are
presented in Tables A.1-A.3 in the Appendix. For example, we ￿nd that less than 5% of
portfolio loans originated before 2000 were hybrid-ARM products. However, at the peak of
the subprime securitization boom in 2005, over 63% of portfolio B & C grade (subprime)
loans originated were hybrid-ARM products. Although securitization may well have aided
and abetted the popularity of subprime hybrid products, prima facie evidence suggests
that the emergence and growth of hybrid-ARM products was not a purely securitization
phenomenon.
The exponential growth in these hybrid mortgage products has been attributed to
several factors. On the demand side, one conjecture is that such products appealed to a
younger demographic with possible expectations of relocating or trading up or looking for
relatively low monthly payments as a means of qualifying for a mortgage (Emmons et al.,
2011). In addition, their growth is often attributed to a sharp increase in the steepness of
the yield curve around 2001. The 10-year/2-year spread that averaged -22 basis points in
2000, averaged in excess of 200 basis points around 2002. As Bhattacharya et al. (2005,
p. 261) observe, this raised the a⁄ordability of hybrid products: "the attractiveness of
ARMs results from the fact that borrowers attain the security of three to ￿ve years of
￿xed payments at rates signi￿cantly lower than those of 30-year ￿xed-rate mortgages." In
the next section, we elaborate on the design of such products. We also ￿nd evidence that
hybrid-ARM products typically involve originations with higher credit risk attributes (see
Section 3.1).
Among hybrid-ARM products, it appears that the popularity of the 2/28 mortgage
was centered on the subprime segment (Haughwout et al., 2009).18 We provide a heuris-
a similar magnitude of growth in this period."
18A ￿2/28￿is a hybrid-ARM with a teaser (￿xed) rate for the ￿rst two years of a 30-year mortgage term.
10tic explanation behind the rapid growth of this product, a formal treatment behind the
optimality of 2/28 mortgages for subprime borrowers is left to future research. In com-
parison with other hybrid products, the 2/28 o⁄ered earlier prepayment, thereby reducing
investors￿risk-exposure to shorter horizons (Schultz et al., 2006). At the same time, this
product was likely better aimed at engaging the borrower over a su¢ cient length of time
and consequently building enough home-equity to re￿nance (see Section 3 for details).
However, data limitations do not permit us to determine whether the 2/28 was preferred
because of superior RMBS performance or simply because it could generate higher orig-
ination volumes. It is likely that the global shortage of safe securities was the central
force behind the creation of complex ￿nancial instruments and engineering to generate
premium-rated securities from a pool of subprime mortgages (Caballero, 2010). At a time
when securitization was singularly involved in bridging the gap between the rise in demand
for (safe) securities and "the expansion of its natural supply," lenders may have aggressively
promoted this product as "the minimum resistance path for the safe-assets imbalance to
release its energy" (Caballero, 2010, p.3).
2.5 The current state of the market
In the aftermath of the current mortgage crisis of 2006-2007, private-label securitization of
non-prime mortgages has ceased. With a sharp decline in benchmark rates, the share of
ARM products as a proportion of all securitized mortgages has also declined sharply from
a peak of 45 % in 2006 to 9.5 % in 2010. Furthermore, this period witnessed a complete
disappearance of non-traditional mortgage products such as hybrid-ARMs, option-ARMs,
and interest only ARMs (Noeth and Sengupta, 2011). As explained below, these products
made up a signi￿cant proportion of the securitized subprime market before 2008. Interest-
ingly, there has been a revival of subprime mortgages in the form of portfolio loans made by
a handful of private investment ￿rms (Androitis, 2011). While these loans allow for lower
credit scores and ￿ exible documentation requirements, they have increased downpayment
requirements signi￿cantly. More importantly, some of these loans appear to have a balloon
structure requiring a borrower to amortize or re￿nance after ￿ve to seven years.
113 Mortgage Design
Table 1 presents the distribution of loans by product type and year of origination (cohort).
To simplify classi￿cation over a very broad range of product types in the market, we de￿ne
these products as ARM2 and ARM3, respectively. As seen from Table 1, the subprime
mortgage market comprises mainly three product types: FRM, ARM2 (which includes the
hybrid 2/28 mortgage product), and ARM3 (which includes the hybrid 3/27).19 Over the
years, the hybrid-ARM products came to dominate originations in the subprime market.
Since most of the troubled mortgages belonged to this product segment, we examine this
segment more closely.
Table 2 presents a summary of the interest rates on subprime mortgage contracts at the
time of loan origination. The second and third columns give us the unconditional means
of the closing rate on ARM and FRM products, respectively. The fourth column gives us
the mean on margins for loans of a given cohort, which on average has been a little more
than 6 % for such loans. The ￿fth and sixth columns give us the (unconditional) mean of
the minimum and the maximum interest rates that could be charged over the lifetime of
these contracts. The last column indicates that, for an overwhelming majority of subprime
loans, the closing teaser rate was the lifetime minimum that would be charged on such
mortgages.
Essentials of the role of interest rates in subprime mortgage design can be obtained
from Table 2. Evidently teaser rates on hybrid-ARM products were not signi￿cantly lower
when compared with closing rates on other products for subprime mortgages. In fact, we
do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erence between the unconditional means of closing rates on
FRMs and hybrid-ARMs. This is true for originations of all cohorts in our sample period
(1998-2007). Typically however, teaser rates on hybrid-ARMs are lower than borrowers
of a given risk pro￿le are likely to receive on other comparable products, which would
suggest some degree of self selection into hybrid-ARM contracts by borrowers with higher
risk characteristics.
Second, the closing rate on an overwhelming majority of hybrid-ARM originations is
equal to the minimum rate for the lifetime of the mortgage. While this is not surprising, it is
important to point out that this restriction ensures that the loan resets to the indexed rate
could only be a ￿step up￿but not a ￿step down.￿Third, these closing rates on subprime
19Not all ARM2 and ARM3 mortgages have a thirty-year maturity period. Therefore, while 2/28s and
3/27s make up the majority of loans in these two categories, they do not constitute all such loans.
12mortgages (both ARMs and FRMs) are signi￿cantly lower than those on other subprime
markets (such as subprime auto-loans). For example, Adams et al. (2009) report that the
average interest rate (APR) on subprime auto loans in their sample is 26.2 %. As explained
below, this distinction is critical for understanding the design of subprime mortgages.
The pricing of subprime mortgage products raises some important questions. First, why
were interest rates on subprime mortgages signi￿cantly lower than those on other subprime
markets, like those on auto loans? Second, why do hybrid-ARM subprime products have
resets that step up but do not step down? To answer these questions, our analysis follows
the theory on mortgage design as presented in Gorton (2008). In what follows, we provide
empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis, arguing that, at least from the perspective
of individual lenders and borrowers entering into subprime contracts, house price patterns
can be treated as exogenous.
As will be shown below, default rates on subprime mortgages even for the best cohorts
were signi￿cantly high. Therefore, while the interest rate on such mortgages can be set to
price the risk (like that on subprime auto loans), it is not likely that such a rate is a⁄ordable
for subprime borrowers. This is because mortgage payment obligations are signi￿cantly
higher than payments for other forms of consumer debt, including auto loans. In addition,
we observe that, unlike auto loans, the underlying values of the collateral on residential
subprime mortgages were appreciating in price. This would give an otherwise distressed
subprime borrower the option to prepay the mortgage (either re￿nance or sell the property)
and avoid default. In short, the basic idea of the subprime loan recognizes that the domi-
nant form of wealth of low-income households is potentially their home equity. Therefore,
unlike subprime auto loans, subprime mortgages could have registered signi￿cantly lower
default rates through prepayment if the underlying collateral appreciated in value. As a
result, mortgage products could be o⁄ered at signi￿cantly lower rates than auto loans.
Gorton (2008) argues that lenders avoided exposing themselves to long-term contracts
(such as thirty-year mortgages) because of the high risk pro￿le of subprime borrowers.
They did this by placing terms and conditions on the loan that would ideally force the
borrower to return to the lender at shorter intervals. In a nutshell, the fully indexed rate
that the borrower is required to pay at the time of the teaser rate reset was designed to be
a step up so that the borrower had a strong incentive to re￿nance the loan.
This hypothesis helps answer the second question posed above. The hybrid-ARM prod-
uct with teaser rates and step up reset is essentially designed to limit the lender￿ s exposure
to a mortgage signi￿cantly shorter than thirty years. Furthermore, over 70 % of subprime
13originations were re￿nances and a majority of these were cash-out re￿nances. From the
borrower￿ s perspective, the subprime mortgage contract was viewed as a means to tide over
temporary liquidity constraints. It is important to remember that subprime borrowers are
otherwise unable to access more conventional sources of ￿nancing because of their impaired
and imperfect credit histories. These features suggest that subprime mortgage contracts
have the elements of a bridge-￿nancing loan for borrowers facing liquidity constraints.
The view that these products were originally intended as bridge-￿nancing is corrobo-
rated in policy documents as well:
These products originally were extended to customers primarily as a tem-
porary credit accommodation in anticipation of early sale of the property or in
expectation of future earnings growth. However, these loans have more recently
been o⁄ered to subprime borrowers as credit repair or a⁄ordability products.20
Importantly, subsequent legislation has made it mandatory that the borrower￿ s repay-
ment ability should be judged by his ability to pay the fully indexed rate and not the
teaser:
For all nontraditional mortgage loan products, an institution￿ s analysis of
a borrower￿ s repayment capacity should include an evaluation of their ability
to repay the debt by ￿nal maturity at the fully indexed rate, assuming a fully
amortizing repayment.21
Obviously, the above design raises doubts as to the long-run viability of such mortgage
products. Gorton (2008) argues that the mortgage design sought to bene￿t from house price
appreciation over short horizons. In a period of rising house prices, borrowers can build
up equity in their homes and become less risky, ceteris paribus, on subsequent mortgages.
This allows them to re￿nance at a lower rate (on the subsequent mortgage), which also
reduces the likelihood of default. Presumably, this would require multiple re￿nances till
the borrower is eligible for more conventional sources of ￿nancing. Critical to the success
of this design is that the borrower does not re￿nance early and extract equity. This is
achieved by including a prepayment penalty on the mortgage contract.
Table 3 presents the summary data on prepayment penalties, prepayment terms, and
their relation to reset dates. Columns (1) and (2) show that the approximately 60% to75%
20Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007).
21Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2006).
14of FRMs and 70% to 80% of ARMs include prepayment penalties. These summary ￿ndings
can be used to corroborate Gorton￿ s hypothesis. If true, then for a majority of these loans
the prepayment term should not expire before the reset date. That is, the penalty would
compel borrowers to continue making payments until the reset date, at which time the
borrower could opt to prepay (re￿nance). Indeed, that is exactly what we ￿nd for over
90 % of such loans (Column 3). Interestingly, the prepayment term ends exactly on the
reset date for a majority of loans and this proportion seems to increase over the years in
our sample period (Column 5). For loans in which the prepayment term expires before the
reset date, the length of the term (in months) is on average half the duration for which the
teaser rate is in e⁄ect (Column 4). Conversely, for loans in which the prepayment term is
longer, it is on average at least 1.5 times lengthier (Column 7). The results in Tables 2 and
3 demonstrate the rationale behind the design on subprime mortgages. Most importantly,
they demonstrate that the viability for an overwhelming majority of subprime contracts
was predicated on the appreciation of home prices.
3.1 Product Choice and Interest Rates
To model consumer product choice and margin requirements on subprime products, we
use the Heckman￿ s (1979) two-step estimation procedure (results shown in Table 4). In
the ￿rst step we use a selection equation (probit) to model the choice of a hybrid-ARM
product over the FRM product (Column 1, Table 4). The second step is a least squares
regression determining the margin requirement on hybrid-ARM products (Column 2, Table
4). In addition to location and property characteristics, both equations use origination
characteristics as covariates. Notably, however, there are some endogeneity issues with
these speci￿cations since most loan contract terms are co-determined. This caveat would
apply to interpretations of causality here.
As reported in Table 4, coe¢ cients have the expected signs and are highly signi￿cant
across the di⁄erent speci￿cations. In comparison with FRMs, hybrid-ARM loans are more
likely to be originations with lower origination FICO, higher LTV, and prepayment penal-
ties but without full documentation (see Column (1)). Evidently, owner-occupied and
second-home properties are less likely to be ￿nanced with hybrid-ARM products than in-
vestment properties. This would suggest that ex ante there is a self-selection of observably
riskier originations into hybrid-ARMs. In the second stage, we estimate an OLS regression
on the determinants of the margin on hybrid products. In addition to the covariates in the
15￿rst stage, we use a dummy variable that takes the value one if the product type was an
ARM2 and zero otherwise. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on the ARM2 dummy is negative
and signi￿cant, showing that ARM2 loans were more attractive than other hybrid-ARM
products in terms of lower margin rates on the product. As in the ￿rst stage, all coe¢ cients
are statistically signi￿cant and have the expected sign. For example, margin requirements
are lower for originations with higher FICO scores, owner-occupied properties (as opposed
to investor properties), and full documentation for the mortgage.
From the standpoint of the mortgage contract design, margin requirements should
ideally re￿ ect borrower risk. However, if our conjecture on mortgage design is correct, then
most borrowers would seek to prepay the mortgage on or around the reset date. To the
extent that borrowers expect to prepay around or near the reset date, it is the closing rate
(the teaser rate for hybrid-ARM products) on the mortgage rather than the margin rate
that is likely to be more relevant to borrower origination choice. In any event, both the
margin and the closing rate should ideally re￿ ect credit risk on the origination. To test
this further, we de￿ne the variable Mortgage Rate Spread as the di⁄erence between the
closing rate on the mortgage and the 6-month LIBOR average for the origination month.
Column (3) in Table 4 reports the OLS estimates for this spread on the set of origination
characteristics discussed above. Indeed, the coe¢ cient estimates for the Mortgage Rate
Spread are similar in sign and magnitude to those for the Margin estimates in Column (2).
These results would suggest that both the Spread and the Margin capture similar
e⁄ects of origination characteristics. However, ARM2 products have lower margin rates
in comparision with ARM3 products, whereas in comparison with FRM products ARM2
and ARM3 products on average have a marginally higher Spread. Moreover, we see little
evidence of lower Margin or Spread in exchange for prepayment penalties on originations.
On the contrary, originations with higher rates are more likely to have prepayment penalties
on them. Given our earlier results, this could well be a re￿ ection of penalties and higher
rates being correlated on riskier originations. However, without identi￿cation of demand
and supply e⁄ects, it is di¢ cult to attribute causality or optimality of such arrangements.
These regressions are best viewed in terms of the equilibrium relationship between contract
terms (product types and mortgage rates) on the one hand and origination characteristics
on the other.
164 The Evidence on Subprime Prepayments
Table 5 summarizes prepayment behavior in the subprime mortgage market. The numbers
denote the proportion of surviving mortgages (i.e., those not in default) by product type
that were prepaid within 12 months from the year of origination. The period of study
in each case is from the time of origination to the end of a calendar year up to the ￿rst
two, three, or four calendar years after the year of origination.22 For example, 38 % of all
surviving FRM loans originated in 1998 were prepaid by the end of 2001. Three trends are
immediately obvious from the data. First, the prepayment rates for ARMs are higher than
those for FRMs of the same cohort. Second, for mortgages originated between 1998 and
2003, the prepayment rates continue to increase progressively over time. This is true across
all product types. Third, for mortgages originated after 2004, there has been a decline in
the prepayment rates, and this has been particularly severe for the years 2006 and 2007.
Following our analysis of mortgage design in the previous section, we should witness
a high re￿nance rate for subprime originations in our data. Indeed the evidence points
to the critical role of prepayments in the subprime mortgage market. Moreover, as stated
previously, prepayment can be an exit option for distressed borrowers, and this option can
be used either before the borrower becomes delinquent on the mortgage, as a means to
avoid delinquency, or, after delinquency, as a means to avoid foreclosure.
To provide a more detailed picture of these trends, we track the following loan status
variables over time: delinquency, prepayment, and foreclosure. For each cohort (year of
origination), we record loans that experience a delinquency (as a fraction of total orig-
inations) within the ￿rst two calendar years after the year of origination. We do this
separately for loans that experience a 30-day and a 60-day delinquency over these periods.
Among these delinquent loans, we tabulate those that were prepaid and those that went
into foreclosure. Table 6 presents these summary results for owner-occupied subprime orig-
inations.23 The pattern that emerges is robust across occupancy categories, loan purpose,
and product type and is summarized as follows:
1. Both 30-day and 60-day delinquencies are higher for loans originated after 2004.
2. Loans that register a 30-day delinquency are more likely to prepay than loans that
22Our choice of calendar year over the more conventional method of presenting the distribution by loan
age here is motivated by much of the commentary on this market arguing that conditions started worsening
after a calendar date.
23Owner-occupied originations comprise over 90 percent of all originations for each cohort in our sample
period (1998-2007).
17record a 60-day delinquency in the same period.
3. There is an increase in foreclosure rates on delinquent loans for originations after
2004, especially during 2006-2007.
4. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a sharp decline in prepayment rates
for post-2004 originations, especially during 2006-2007.
Clearly, prepayments and foreclosures can be viewed as exit options following a delin-
quency. Interestingly, the total of early prepayments and foreclosures post-delinquency
(obtained by adding up the percentages in panels B and C of Table 6) for each cohort does
not reveal an increasing trend. Stated di⁄erently, the percentages of delinquent loans that
were either prepaid or went into foreclosure are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent over our sample
period. Remarkably, however, there is a sharp drop in the proportion of early prepayments
accompanied by a sharp rise in the proportion of foreclosures for post-2004 originations,
especially during 2006 and 2007.
However, this still does not address the concern that delinquencies are marginally higher
for post-2004 originations. To explain this feature of the data, we adopt a similar approach,
but this time by studying pre-delinquency repayment behavior. In Figures 3-5 we present,
for the ￿rst 18 months since origination, the percentage of mortgages for every cohort that
either (1) registered a 30-day delinquency or (2) were prepaid before recording a 30-day
delinquency. We also calculate the total fraction of loans in either of these categories. Note
that the duration of study is di⁄erent from the tables presented above in that we observe
each loan for the ￿rst 18 months since origination rather than up to a speci￿c calendar date.
But just as observed previously, the total proportion of early prepayments and delinquencies
is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent over our sample period. Moreover, the pattern appears to be
similar to that observed in Table 6: a signi￿cantly large fraction of total originations are
prepaid early in the subprime market and this fraction drops for originations after 2004,
especially during 2006-2007. Most important, these graphs show that these ￿ndings are
robust across variations in product type (Figure 3), occupancy (Figure 4), and loan purpose
(Figure 5).
To summarize, we ￿nd a distinct pattern of high early prepayment behavior on subprime
mortgages for earlier cohorts followed by a sharp drop in early prepayment rates for later
(post-2004) cohorts, especially during 2006-2007. This result holds regardless of whether
we track originations over a given loan age or particular calendar dates, consider post-
delinquency or pre-delinquency behavior, study repayment across the di⁄erent categories
of occupancy, product type, and loan purpose. Post-delinquency, the total fraction of
18loans that either go into foreclosure or are paid o⁄remain roughly the same for all cohorts.
Again, the total fraction of loans that register their ￿rst delinquency or get paid o⁄ before
registering a delinquency are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent for all cohorts. Our data do not
permit us to determine the cause of prepayment. However, prepayments are an exit option
available to a distressed borrower unable to make mortgage payments. Moreover, given
that a signi￿cant proportion of subprime originations came with prepayment penalties for
two or more years, the trend in early prepayments is suggestive of prepayments under
distress.
Why are early prepayments important to our analysis? Much of this has to do with
the alternative explanations behind subprime defaults. Figures 6 plots the Kaplan-Meier
default probabilities. With the exception of originations in 2003, default probabilities in-
creased progressively for each year in the sample period. However, the default probabilities
rise sharply for post-2004 originations. Notably, high default rates for 2005-2007 cohorts
occur well before the loan age of 24 months, typically the reset date on ARM2 products.
Clearly, a jump in the payment obligations on reset cannot be the explanation behind the
crisis.24 Following this, much of the commentary on the subprime crisis has sought to
explain the high early defaults in post-2004 originations. This paper shows that high early
defaults on post-2004 cohorts can be explained in terms of high early prepayment rates for
the pre-2004 originations.
In contrast to Figure 6, Figures 7 plots the Kaplan-Meier prepayment probabilities.
The two plots are not mirror images of each other because there is a third option for the
borrowers to stay current (or delinquent). What has been omitted from these commen-
taries is that, for post-2004 originations, every cohort shows a progressively lower (early)
prepayment probability rate than earlier cohorts for the same age on the loan (Figure 7).
After two calendar years, the prepayment probabilities were 0.44, 0.46, and 0.45 for mort-
gage originations of 2002, 2003, and 2004 cohorts. However, the prepayment probability
on originations of 2005 and 2006 cohorts are 0.36 and 0.23, respectively (note that this
includes their performance during the calendar years 2006 and 2007).
24An earlier explanation of the subprime debacle was that originations made in the low rate environment
around 2003 and 2004 were hit by a jump in the payment obligations when the rate reset to a prohibitively
high indexed rate (during 2005-2007) when the rates were signi￿cantly higher.
195 Estimation and Results
As is standard in the literature on mortgage defaults, this section uses the competing
risk hazard framework to study the determinants of default and prepayment. Default
and prepayment are modeled as competing risks.25 To formalize our argument, we split
borrower repayment behavior into three possible outcomes: (1) the borrower defaults on the
loan, (2) the borrower prepays, (3) the loan is current or even 30-day or 60-day delinquent.
We denote the exit routes by event j, where the two exit events are given by subscript
j = 1;2. For the purposes of this analysis, we do not consider loan status (3) above as
an exit event. Let Tij be the age (in months) at which borrower i chooses event j. The
loan performance of borrower i is observed for minj (Tij) and the hazard function, hij(t),




Pr(t ￿ Tij < t + ￿tjTij ￿ t)
￿t
(1)
Following Cox (1972), the semiparametric representation that we estimate takes the form
hij(t) = h0j(t)exp(Xi￿j), (2)
where h0j(t) is the cumulative baseline hazard rate for event j (1;2) and Xi is the vector
of covariates on mortgage i.
Throughout the analysis and unless explicitly stated, we control for the following orig-
ination characteristics. Loan characteristics such as loan type (conventional, VA, FHA,
government, etc.), loan purpose (purchase, cash-out re￿nance, no cash-out re￿nance, etc.)
and term of prepayment; and property characteristics such as the number of units, prop-
erty type (condo, townhouse etc.), and home value quartile to which the property belongs
are included. Dummy variables for occupancy status (owner-occupied, investor-owned, or
second home) and loan source (like retail, broker, realtor, etc.) and location (state in
which the property is located) are also included. Finally, in all regression speci￿cations by
product type, we include dummy variables for each cohort (year of origination).
In addition, we include the variable Fees and Points calculated from the Freddie Mac
PMM Survey, the most commonly available series for prime borrowers (Figure 2). Although
25A mortgage is considered to be in default if it records a 90-day delinquency event (Cowan and Cowan,
2004). As mentioned earlier, prepayments include mortgages that are paid o⁄ either because the property
is sold o⁄ and loan repaid or because the existing mortgage is re￿nanced.
20the data are collected from prime transactions, the proxy captures how transactions costs
have declined in the mortgage market over this period.26 We also include a dummy variable,
Prepayment Penalty, that takes the value 1 if there is a prepayment penalty on the mortgage
and zero otherwise. As is common in this literature, we measure the intrinsic value of
re￿nancing by the present value annuity ratio or PVt measure proposed by Richard and
Roll (1989). PVt measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage
principal outstanding at time t using the existing mortgage rate, r0, to that using the





1 ￿ (1 + rt)t￿M
1 ￿ (1 + r0)t￿M
￿
,
where M is the maturity period in number of months (360 months for a 30-year mortgage).
Note that if rt = r0, PVt = 1. There is an incentive to re￿nance if rt < r0￿ that is, if
PVt > 1. De￿ning rt and r0 to be the 6-month LIBOR at the time of the event and the
time of origination, we create the variable Present Value Annuity Ratio (PVAR). Ignor-
ing transaction costs, we would expect the incentive to re￿nance to strengthen the more
the PVAR exceeds 1. Kau et al. (1993) suggest that interest rate volatility reduces the
probability of prepayment. Following Ambrose and Sanders (2003), we de￿ne the variable
Interest Rate Volatility as the standard deviation of the 6-month LIBOR for the previous
24 months.
The economic variables that we consider in this framework are house prices and unem-
ployment rate in the location of the property (Fogel et al., 2011). Initially, we study two
di⁄erent measures of house price changes. The ￿rst is House Price Growth (HPG), which
measures the growth of house prices since origination for the MSA in which the property is
located. For this, we use the MSA-level repeat sales index published by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA). The second measure is year-on-year House Price Change (HPY)
at the MSA-level using the same price index. In addition, PosUnempG is de￿ned as a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is an increase in the unemployment rate
over the previous year (as measured by the MSA level unemployment data series published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)) and zero otherwise.
Before discussing the results, we provide a summary for the organization of tables. Our
baseline regression is presented in Table 8. The covariates in Table 8 include house price
26To the best of our knowledge, we are yet to come across a data series on fees and points in the subprime
mortgage market.
21growth since origination (Panel A) and year-on-year change in house prices (Panel B). The
results are qualitatively similar. Non-linearities in the relationship between covariates and
default are examined in Table 9. We use dummies of credit and economic variables to
examine non-linearities in their relationship to default and prepayment. A list of these
dummy variables is provided in Table 7. Next, we examine the e⁄ects of interactions in
credit and economic variables on default and prepayment. The summary results for the
e⁄ects of these interactions are reported for house price growth in Table 11 and unem-
ployment in Table 12. For example, in Tables 11 and 12, column 1 shows hazard ratios
for default on ARM2 products for interactions with house price growth (Table 11) and
unemployment (Table 12). The regression results used to calculate the ratios in column 1
are presented in Table 10. The additional regression results used to calculate the ratios in
columns 2-6 of Tables 11 and 12 are presented in this appendix as Table 10A-E.
Baseline Regressions The estimated hazard ratios for the baseline competing risk re-
gression model are reported in Table 8. We report the hazard ratios for the three major
product types￿ namely, ARM2, ARM3, and FRMs￿ under both the time-to-default and the
time-to-prepayment speci￿cations. The qualitative results appear robust across all product
types for each speci￿cation; the estimated hazard ratios are highly signi￿cant in all speci-
￿cations. A hazard ratio greater than 1 indicates that the increase in the relevant variable
is associated with an increase in the delinquency or prepayment hazard￿ the converse is
true for a hazard ratio that is less than 1. The covariate FICO (scaled) refers to FICO
score of the mortgagor at origination divided by 100. Accordingly, the default hazard on
an ARM2 product origination with a hundred-point higher FICO score is 0.466 times the
default hazard on the lower FICO origination. Likewise, the hazard ratios on the dummy
variable for low-documentation for ARM3 products can be interpreted to mean that ARM3
loans with less than full documentation have 1.499 times the delinquency hazard but only
0.963 times the prepayment hazard of ARM3 loans with full documentation. Not surpris-
ingly, lack of full documentation increases the delinquency hazard but marginally reduces
the prepayment hazard. From the hazard ratios in Table 8, it is obvious that increases
in origination FICO and house price growth reduce the default hazard, whereas increases
in LTV, Fees and Points, and Interest Rate Volatility increase the default hazard. Not
surprisingly, increases in Fees and Points, origination FICO, House Price Growth, and
the PVAR increase the prepayment hazard. At the same time, the likelihood that the
origination has less than full documentation or includes a prepayment penalty reduces the
22prepayment hazard.
Our object of interest here is the hazard ratios for house prices at location￿ namely,
House Price Growth (HPG) and year-on-year House Price Change (HPY). Not surpris-
ingly, an increase in local house prices reduces the default hazard but increases the pre-
payment hazard. The results are qualitatively similar for both HPG and HPY, although
the e⁄ect of HPG on the default hazard is more pronounced. One reason for this could
be that HPG is a better measure of capturing the e⁄ect of home equity built up on the
mortgage. Notably, this result is in line with most theoretical models on mortgage default
that predict a signi￿cantly large e⁄ect of built-up home equity on the hazard of default (see
Daglish (2009) and references therein). Accordingly, in what follows, we restrict attention
to the variable HPG￿ especially since HPG captures the e⁄ect of build-up in home equity
on the mortgage.
Non-linear E⁄ects The competing-risk hazard framework allows for the use of dummy
variables to capture the non-linear e⁄ects of covariates on default and prepayment hazards.
Accordingly, we split both credit and economic variables as listed in Table 7 for House Price
Growth and LTV (Qi and Yang, 2009). The median house price growth for mortgages in
our sample is roughly 8%. We split the HPG variable into three dummies: one each for
HPG that is greater than the median of 8% (HPG_>8), HPG greater than 1 but less
than or equal to 8% (HPG_1_8) or HPG less than or equal to 1% (HPG_lh_1). Note
that the last dummy captures originations for which the house prices have declined since
origination. In addition, we use the PosUnempG dummy as de￿ned before.
The ratios in Table 9 illustrate the e⁄ects of non-linearity in the e⁄ects of covariates on
default and prepayment hazard. Evidently, these non-linearities are stronger in the case
of the default hazard but less pronounced for the prepayment hazard. For example, the
default hazard of originations in FICO_Q1 are around 3 times the hazard of originations
in FICO_Q4 while that for originations in FICO_Q3 are around 1.6 times the default
hazard of FICO_Q4 originations. The corresponding hazard ratios for the prepayment
hazard are around 0.85 and 0.95, respectively. Notably, increases in the default hazard
caused by the movement from a lower to a higher FICO quartile is of a greater order of
magnitude than decreases in the prepayment hazard. This e⁄ect is true for both credit
and economic variables.
More importantly, the non-linear e⁄ects of the HPG dummies on default and prepay-
ment are signi￿cantly larger than that of other covariates. The prepayment hazard for
23HPG_1_8 is almost half of that of HPG_>8 while the HPG_lh_1 is around a ￿fth of
the hazard of HPG_>8. Clearly, low and declining house prices make it a lot harder for a
subprime borrower to re￿nance (prepay). For all product varieties, the default hazard for
HPG_1_8 is over 6 times that of HPG_>8 and in the case of FRMs the default hazard
for HPG_lh_1 is almost 24 times that of HPG_>8. This result is striking even if one
considers that for ARM2 products the default hazard for HPG_lh_1 is almost 14 times
that of HPG_>8. However, this does not imply that the FRM product is riskier than
ARM2 for HPG_lh_1:
At this point, it is important to note that the reported hazard ratios in Table 9 are
in comparison with the baseline hazard for the same mortgage product. If borrowers self-
selecting into ARM products are riskier ex ante than those that select into FRM products,
then it is possible that the default of FRM products is signi￿cantly lower for HPG_>8.
This was suggested from the results in Section 3.1. Since all HPG hazard ratios are
reported in comparison with the default hazard of the same product for HPG_>8, then
it is not surprising to see that the e⁄ect HPG_lh_1 is more pronounced in the case of
FRM loans than ARM loans. Nevertheless, what is clear is that extreme values of HPG
can have strikingly di⁄erent implications both for prepayments and defaults for subprime
borrowers.
Interaction Terms Table 10 reports the hazard ratios on eight speci￿cations of the
time-to-default hazard for ARM2 products. Each speci￿cation reports hazard ratios for
interactions between two sets of various economic and credit dummy variables. A summary
of these interaction e⁄ects are presented in Tables 11 and 12. Strictly speaking, the hazard
ratios in the ￿rst columns in summary Tables 11 and 12 are derived from the regression
in Table 10 on ARM2 mortgages. For example, the hazard ratio of default on Low_Doc
ARM2 products under HPG_lh_1 is given as 18:865 in the ￿rst column and last row of
Table 11. This ratio is derived from the exponential of the sum of coe¢ cients on Low_Doc
(0.329), HPG_lh_1 (2.647) and Low_Doc* HPG_lh_1 (-0.039) in column (5) of Table
10￿ that is, exp(2:937) = 18:865. A similar set of calculations help us derive the hazard
ratios on interactions with unemployment growth in Table 12. The regression tables for
the rest of the columns in Tables 11 and 12 are presented in an appendix to this paper.
Tables 11 and 12 reveal the non-linearity in interaction e⁄ects of economic and credit
variables on the hazard of default and prepayment. For the categories chosen in Table 11,
the e⁄ect of HPG dominates the e⁄ect of economic variables in changing the hazard of
24default and prepayment. Within a given category of HPG, changes in the categories of the
credit variable lead to smaller changes in the hazard ratios, whereas changes in HPG for a
given category of the credit variable leads to larger changes in these ratios. For example,
consider originations in FICO_Q3 and HPG_>8. Within the category of borrowers with
HPG above median, HPG_>8, the default hazard of the lowest FICO quartile is less than 5
times the default hazard of the highest FICO quartile. On the other hand, within the same
FICO quartile, FICO_Q3, the default hazard of loans with HPG_1_8 is more than 7 times
the default hazard of loans with HPG_>8. Similar trends are observed for the prepayment
hazard and for HPG and other credit variables such as LTV and documentation.
In studying the ratios across product types in Table 11, we ￿nd that for given interac-
tions among variables, the e⁄ect on the hazards is typically stronger for ARM3 and FRM
in comparison with ARM2 products. However, this result does not imply that the ARM3
and FRM products are riskier under low HPG. As shown in Tables 11 and 12, the hazard
ratios are in comparison with baseline values of economic and credit variables within the
same product category. It is possible that, because of self-selection into riskier products,
the baseline hazard of ARM2 products are riskier than ARM3 or FRM products.27 In
this case, it is not surprising to ￿nd default hazard ratios of higher magnitude for FRM
products than for ARM2. That said, we can de￿nitely assert that the e⁄ect of di⁄erences
in HPG is more pronounced on default and prepayment hazards for FRM products than
for ARM products.
Lastly, in comparing the interaction e⁄ects of economic variables (Table 12), it is not
di¢ cult to see that the e⁄ect of local house price growth dominates that of local unem-
ployment. Moving within the same category of HPG from NegUnempG to PosUnempG
increases default hazards and decreases prepayment hazards marginally. For example,
within HPG_1_8 moving from NegUnempG to PosUnempG increases default hazards
from around 6 times the baseline to 7 times the baseline. On the other hand, within
NegUnempG moving from HPG_1_8 to HPG_lh_1 increases the default hazard from 6
times the baseline to anywhere between 12-22 times the baseline.
27It is also the case that ARMs have some unique risk factors due to interest-rate-dependent payment
uncertainty. Under certain conditions, they are viewed as riskier loans ex post (Calem and LaCour-Little,
2004).
256 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on subprime mortgage design as credit-accommodation prod-
ucts. It documents how legislation permitted the use of subprime originations in the form
of cash-out re￿nances as a means of debt consolidation for liquidity-constrained and credit-
impaired households. We also show that riskier households opted for subprime products
that allowed temporary credit relief. At the same time, securitization provided investors
with short-term exposure to high-yields on subprime products. Ultimately, for both bor-
rower and the lender, prepayment was the desired exit option. As Shiller (2008, p.50)
argues, exploiting the appreciation of house prices was the key to the viability of the sub-
prime:
Adjustable-rate mortgages were common because those who had been in-
￿ uenced by bubble thinking and wanted to get into real estate investments as
heavily as possible were demanding them. The mere fact that interest payments
would be going up soon did not deter them. They expected to be compensated
by rapidly increasing home prices, and they believed that those higher prices
would permit them to re￿nance at a lower rate.
The motivation behind this thinking originates from the steep rise in house prices in
U.S. metropolitan areas since 1995 (see Figure 1). Contrary to most theoretical predictions,
the house prices did not turn down and the housing boom continued unabated despite the
recession in 2001. As Case and Shiller (2003) noted during the boom years, U.S. house
prices have been rising faster than incomes and faster than other prices in virtually every
metropolitan area. Yet, the growth of subprime lending continued unabated.
In the end, the basic idea of the subprime loan recognizes that the dominant form of
wealth of low-income households is potentially their home equity. Therefore, unlike sub-
prime auto-loans, subprime mortgages can register signi￿cantly lower default rates through
prepayment if the underlying collateral appreciates in value. Indeed, both high and early
prepayment rates sustained the subprime boom. It is also the reason why, during the col-
lapse of subprime loan performance, most defaults occurred early. We demonstrate that
such high early defaults on post-2004 originations can be explained when one considers
high early prepayment rates of pre-2004 originations. In a regime of rising house prices, a
￿nancially distressed borrower can avoid default by prepayment. Naturally, defaults began
to increase once house prices failed to appreciate in 2006.
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Figure 1: Evolution of House Prices 1991-2009  
The series below show the S&P Case-Shiller Composite-10 house price index (CSXR) and the FHFA Purchase Only House Price index, all normalized to the 
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Figure 2: Fees and Points on 30-yr Fixed Rate Mortgages 





Source:  Primary Mortgage Market Survey, FHLMC (Freddie Mac). 
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Table 1: Evolution of the Subprime Market (market share by product type) 
Table summarizes first lien subprime mortgages by product type as fixed or adjustable rate mortgages (FRM and ARM) for every year of origination from 1998 to 2007. The 
numbers give us the market share for a particular product type. ARM2 and ARM3 denote hybrid-ARM products where the teaser rate is fixed for two and three years 
respectively. Other product types include ARM-other, Balloon, Two-Step, GPM, GEM and GPARM. The total number denotes the number of originations in each category. 
 
 
  Product Type 
Year of origination  FRM  ARM2  ARM3  Other  Total  Number 
1998  51.33  26.53  4.52  17.62  253264 
1999  38.88  29.34  19.21  12.57  369424 
2000  32.58  43.29  14.78  9.35  399368 
2001  31.70  48.69  12.44  7.17  498494 
2002  28.37  54.84  12.62  4.17  755578 
2003  33.57  52.60  11.37  2.46  1265769 
2004  23.81  59.73  14.64  1.81  1922451 
2005  18.66  65.48  13.22  2.64  2266502 
2006  19.98  62.56  10.86  6.61  1776422 
2007  27.59  50.23  9.92  12.26  330901 
Total    25.70  56.73  12.70  4.87  9838173 
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Table 2: Interest Rates on Subprime Loans 
The second and the third columns report the unconditional mean of the closing interest rate for originations of a particular cohort. For hybrid-ARMs this is the teaser rate. The 
number in parentheses shows the standard deviations. The (unconditional) means of margin on reset, the lifetime maximum and minimum interest rates for ARMs are given in 
columns 4-6 respectively. The last column gives the percent of ARMs for which the closing interest rate is equal to the lifetime minimum interest rate on the loan. 
 
 
  FRMs  ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES (ARMs) 
   Closing Interest Rate  Margin   Life Time Max  Life Time Min  Closing Rate is the Minimum 
Year of origination  Avg. (s.d.)  Avg. (s.d.)  Avg. (s.d.)  Avg. (s.d.)  (as % of ARM) 
1998 
9.92  9.92  6.16  16.44  9.65  89.1% 
  (1.6)  (1.22)  (0.88)  (1.33)  (1.5) 
1999 
10.15  10.08  6.29  16.46  9.95  94.2% 
  (1.57)  (1.2)  (0.83)  (1.37)  (1.37) 
2000  10.98  10.6  6.2  17.04  10.43  94.7% 
  (1.55)  (1.28)  (0.92)  (1.5)  (1.63) 
2001  9.71  9.68  6.36  16.1  9.5  91.9% 
  (1.65)  (1.36)  (1.18)  (1.46)  (1.59) 
2002 
8.52  8.73  6.63  15.07  8.64  95.5% 
  (1.44)  (1.32)  (1.32)  (1.42)  (1.42) 
2003  7.49  7.74  6.29  14.07  7.68  96.0% 
  (1.21)  (1.22)  (1.34)  (1.4)  (1.25) 
2004  7.23  7.3  6.1  13.69  7.24  95.7% 
  (1.15)  (1.16)  (1.11)  (1.23)  (1.19) 
2005 
7.43  7.54  5.96  13.86  7.42  93.2% 
  (1.17)  (1.15)  (1.04)  (1.24)  (1.25) 
2006  8.34  8.49  6.09  14.82  8.25  91.1% 
  (1.3)  (1.15)  (0.91)  (1.26)  (1.41) 
2007 
8.65  8.6  6  14.94  7.93 
76.8% 
(1.46)  (1.26)  (0.79)  (1.37)  (1.56)   35 
Table 3: Prepayment Term and Date of First Reset 
The prepayment term is the duration (in months) for which the prepayment penalty is in effect. The First Reset Date is the date at which the hybrid-ARM resets from the closing 
(teaser) interest rate to the fully-indexed interest rate. Columns (1) and (2) give the percent of mortgages by cohort that include a prepayment penalty in their contract. Column (3) 
shows proportion of loans for which the prepayment term ends before the first reset date expressed as a percentage of loans for which we have data on the prepayment term. 
Column (4) shows the difference in duration between the prepayment term and the first reset date expressed as a ratio of the durations of the two periods. 
 
 
  FRMs  ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES (ARMs) 
 
Percent with Prepayment 
Penalty 
Prepayment Term ends before 
First Reset Date 
Prepayment 
Term ends at 
First Reset 
Date 
Prepayment Term ends after  
First Reset Date 











origination  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1998  53%  71%  8%  0.49  57%  35%  1.82 
1999  60%  80%  4%  0.47  54%  42%  1.78 
2000  61%  85%  4%  0.49  64%  32%  1.89 
2001  68%  86%  4%  0.49  69%  27%  1.66 
2002  69%  85%  4%  0.48  76%  21%  1.62 
2003  72%  79%  5%  0.47  81%  14%  1.56 
2004  75%  74%  6%  0.47  83%  11%  1.55 
2005  74%  72%  7%  0.49  85%  8%  1.52 
2006  72%  71%  7%  0.50  88%  5%  1.52 
2007  69%  69%  8%  0.50  89%  3%  1.51 
1. Expressed as a percentage of the total number of loans for which the data on prepayment term is available.  
2. Expressed as a ratio of the duration of the prepayment term to the duration up to the reset date.   
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Table 4: Product Choice and Interest Rates 
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure.  Estimates of the selection equation for 
hybrid-ARMs over FRMs are reported in column (1). Column (2) shows OLS estimates with Margin as the dependent 
variable. Finally, column (3) reports the estimates of the least squares regression of Mortgage Rate Spread on origination 
characteristics. In addition to the covariates given below, we control for property type (dummies for single-family 
residence, condo, townhouse, co-operative, etc), property location (dummies for the state in which the property is located) 
and loan source (dummies for broker, realtor, wholesale, retail etc.) and number of units in the property. Home Value nth 
Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-the quartile of all property values in the data 
and zero otherwise.  
 
  Heckman Two Stage Estimates 
Least Squares    Selection (Probit)  Least Squares 
Dependent variable  Hybrid-ARM=1  Margin  Mortgage Rate Spread 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  2.845 ***  8.528 ***  7.436 *** 
FICO (scaled)  -0.490 ***  -0.487 ***  -0.864 *** 
LTV  0.019 ***  0.004 ***  0.006 *** 
Low-Documentation dummy  0.279 ***  0.146 ***  0.372 *** 
Prepayment Penalty dummy  0.160 ***  0.052 ***  0.122 *** 
Fees and Points  -0.010 ***  0.004 ***  0.037 *** 
Owner Occupied dummy  -0.016 ***  -0.104 ***  -0.541 *** 
Second Home dummy  -0.085 ***  -0.041 ***  -0.394 *** 
Home Value First Quartile  -0.410 ***  0.329 ***  0.906 *** 
Home Value Second Quartile  -0.226 ***  0.191 ***  0.597 *** 
Home Value Third Quartile  -0.132 ***  0.088 ***  0.304 *** 
ARM2 dummy  ---  -0.214 ***  0.020 *** 
ARM3 dummy  ---  ----  0.006 ** 
Log-Likelihood  -2482173.2  ---  --- 
Adjusted R-Square  ---  0.157  0.223 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 5:  Prepayment Rates by Mortgage Product Type  
The numbers in the table denote the fraction of surviving loans that were paid off before they become seriously delinquent shown here by product type. The loans 
are organized by year of origination and the period of study for each loan extends to the end of the calendar year.  
                     
Year of mortgage origination    1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Fixed                     
Up to 1 calendar year  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.06 
Up to 2 calendar years  0.14  0.14  0.24  0.31  0.39  0.36  0.32  0.24  0.16   
Up to 3 calendar years  0.23  0.28  0.40  0.50  0.55  0.51  0.42  0.30     
Up to 4 calendar years  0.38  0.44  0.52  0.61  0.65  0.59  0.48       
Up to 5 calendar years  0.50  0.55  0.60  0.68  0.70  0.63         
                     
ARM2                     
Up to 1 calendar year  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.14  0.17  0.14  0.11  0.07 
Up to 2 calendar years  0.23  0.23  0.31  0.37  0.43  0.49  0.47  0.36  0.21   
Up to 3 calendar years  0.58  0.51  0.57  0.64  0.71  0.77  0.75  0.56     
Up to 4 calendar years  0.68  0.63  0.67  0.73  0.78  0.82  0.78       
Up to 5 calendar years  0.72  0.70  0.72  0.76  0.80  0.83         
                     
ARM3                     
Up to 1 calendar year  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.16  0.14  0.10  0.07 
Up to 2 calendar years  0.18  0.23  0.29  0.34  0.41  0.46  0.47  0.36  0.21   
Up to 3 calendar years  0.33  0.41  0.47  0.54  0.58  0.62  0.61  0.45     
Up to 4 calendar years  0.51  0.57  0.63  0.70  0.75  0.79  0.74       
Up to 5 calendar years  0.59  0.64  0.69  0.74  0.79  0.82         
                                
Source: Authors’ calculations from Corelogic data. 
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Table 6:  Repayment Behavior of Owner Occupied Households (up to two calendar years from year of origination). 
Delinquency rate is based on percentage of total loans in the sample. We consider both loans that are both 30-day and 60-day delinquent. 
Among the loans that are delinquent, we consider those that were prepaid and those that went into foreclosure. We do this separately for 
loans that were 30-day and 60-day delinquent. The second panel is prepayment rate, the number of loans prepaid expressed as percentage 
of loans that are delinquent in each category. The third panel is the foreclosure rate, the number of loans foreclosed expressed as 
percentage of loans that are delinquent in each category. 
 
Panel A. Delinquency Rate  
(% of total loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Year of 
origination  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years 
1998  21%  28%  32%  8%  12%  14% 
1999  26%  33%  37%  10%  14%  17% 
2000  31%  37%  40%  13%  17%  20% 
2001  33%  39%  41%  13%  18%  20% 
2002  33%  37%  39%  13%  17%  19% 
2003  27%  31%  32%  11%  14%  15% 
2004  29%  33%  35%  13%  17%  19% 
2005  34%  42%    19%  28%   
2006  46%      34%     
Panel B. Prepayment Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Year of 
origination  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years 
1998  22%  36%  45%  13%  21%  26% 
1999  22%  36%  46%  13%  20%  26% 
2000  24%  39%  49%  13%  20%  26% 
2001  26%  44%  54%  15%  24%  30% 
2002  32%  51%  60%  18%  28%  35% 
2003  35%  53%  60%  20%  30%  35% 
2004  33%  49%  52%  19%  26%  27% 
2005  22%  27%    10%  11%   
2006  9%      3%     
Panel C. Foreclosure Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Year of 
origination  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years 
1998  11%  15%  19%  29%  36%  42% 
1999  11%  16%  19%  29%  39%  42% 
2000  14%  19%  22%  35%  40%  44% 
2001  12%  17%  20%  29%  37%  41% 
2002  11%  16%  19%  29%  36%  39% 
2003  11%  15%  17%  27%  33%  37% 
2004  11%  17%  20%  26%  34%  38% 
2005  17%  28%    30%  42%   
2006  27%      36%     
Source: Authors’ calculations using Corelogic data. 
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Figure 7: Kaplan Meier Prepayment Probabilities 
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Table 7: List of Variables 
 
FICO_Q1  Dummy variable equal to one if origination FICO is in the 1
st quartile and zero otherwise. 
FICO_Q2  Dummy variable equal to one if origination FICO is in the 2
nd quartile and zero otherwise. 
FICO_Q3  Dummy variable equal to one if origination FICO is in the 3
rd quartile and zero otherwise. 
FICO_Q4  Dummy variable equal to one if origination FICO is in the 4
th quartile and zero otherwise. 
LTV_7  Dummy variable equal to one if LTV is less than 80 percent and zero otherwise 
LTV_8  Dummy variable equal to one if LTV is greater than or equal to 80 but less than 90 percentand 
zero otherwise 
LTV_9  Dummy variable equal to one if LTV is greater than or equal to 90 but less than 100 percent 
and zero otherwise 
LTV_10  Dummy variable equal to one if LTV is greater than or equal to 100 percent and  zero 
otherwise 
Low_Doc  Dummy variable equal to one if the mortgage does not have full documentation and zero 
otherwise. 
Prep. Penalty  Dummy variable equal to one if the mortgage includes a prepayment penalty and zero 
otherwise. 
Fees and Points  Fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM prime mortgage, 
taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey 
Interest Volatility  Standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months 
Present Value Annualized 
Ratio (PVAR) 
Measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding 
using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current rate available on refinance 
House Price Change (HPY)  Percentage change in the MSA-level FHFA house price index since previous year for the MSA 
in which the property is located 
House Price Growth (HPG)  Percentage change in the MSA-level FHFA house price index since origination for the MSA in 
which the property is located 
HPG_lh_1  Dummy variable equal to one if HPGis less than or equal to 1 percent and zero otherwise. 
HPG_1_8  Dummy variable equal to one if HPG is greater than 1 percent but less than or equal to 8 
percent and zero otherwise. 
HPG_>8  Dummy variable equal to one if HPG is greater than 8 percent and zero otherwise. 
PosUnempG  Dummy variable equal to one if the MSA records and increase in the unemployment rate over 
the previous year and zero otherwise (Source: BLS data) 
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Table 8: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by Product Type 
 






ARM2  ARM3  Fixed 
  Default  Prepayment  Default  Prepayment  Default  Prepayment 
FICO (scaled)  0.466***  1.080***  0.507***  1.070***  0.498***  1.130*** 
LTV  1.026***  0.994***  1.024***  0.995***  1.020***  0.996*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.501***  0.978***  1.449***  0.963***  1.337***  0.958*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.999  0.770***  1.066***  0.753***  1.221***  0.851*** 
Fees and Points  1.104***  1.044***  1.118***  1.051***  1.115***  1.054*** 
Interest Volatility  1.015***  1.003***  1.013***  1.003***  1.012***  1.004*** 
PVAR  1.004***  1.004***  1.003***  1.004***  1.003***  1.003*** 
House Price Growth (HPG)  0.816***  1.087***  0.782***  1.091***  0.767***  1.038*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.175***  0.956***  1.106***  0.961***  1.098***  0.992*** 
LR  827655  1653899  173637  434783  306145  777460 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 







ARM2  ARM3  Fixed 
  Default  Prepayment  Default  Prepayment  Default  Prepayment 
FICO (scaled)  0.45***  1.136***  0.476***  1.122***  0.461***  1.148*** 
LTV  1.026***  0.993***  1.023***  0.994***  1.019***  0.996*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.549***  0.955***  1.488***  0.948***  1.332***  0.954*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.982**  0.788***  1.055**  0.778***  1.122***  0.874*** 
Fees and Points  1.097***  1.037***  1.113***  1.044***  1.119***  1.049*** 
Interest Volatility  1.012***  1.003***  1.009***  1.003***  1.011***  1.004*** 
PVAR  1.004***  1.004***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003*** 
House Price Change (HPY)  0.981***  1.04***  0.977***  1.039***  0.958***  1.026*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.039***  0.949***  1.07***  0.944***  1.119***  0.974*** 
LR  511964  1319378  218091  367496  107562  772160 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively. 
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ARM2  ARM3  Fixed 
  Default  Prepayment  Default  Prepayment  Default  Prepayment 
FICO_Q1 dummy  3.245***  0.882***  2.97***  0.899***  3.403***  0.825*** 
FICO_Q2 dummy  2.122***  0.93***  2.038***  0.95***  2.261***  0.929*** 
FICO_Q3 dummy  1.559***  0.961***  1.557***  0.978***  1.709***  0.961*** 
LTV_8 dummy  1.391***  0.903***  1.342***  0.92***  1.386***  0.917*** 
LTV_9 dummy  1.675***  0.864***  1.609***  0.898***  1.719***  0.864*** 
LTV_10 dummy  2.476***  0.761***  2.265***  0.827***  2.332***  0.805*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.486***  0.977***  1.444***  0.971***  1.351***  0.957*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.007  0.763***  1.039  0.765***  1.166***  0.851*** 
Fees and Points  1.101***  1.05***  1.116***  1.057***  1.115***  1.059*** 
Interest Volatility  1.014***  1.004***  1.011***  1.004***  1.011***  1.005*** 
PVAR  1.004***  1.004***  1.003***  1.004***  1.003***  1.003*** 
HPG_1_8  6.437***  0.445***  7.051***  0.443***  6.823***  0.589*** 
HPG_lh_1  13.838***  0.223***  18.55***  0.204***  23.936***  0.22*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.181***  0.963***  1.162***  0.954***  1.142***  0.994*** 
LR  702862  1448270  145356  392735  268049  807285 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 10: Default Hazard Ratios for ARM2 products 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
FICO_Q1 dummy  3.245***  3.242***  3.228***  4.918***  3.249***  3.247***  3.328***  3.245*** 
FICO_Q2 dummy  2.122***  2.121***  2.113***  2.757***  2.123***  2.124***  2.15***  2.122*** 
FICO_Q3 dummy  1.559***  1.558***  1.554***  1.806***  1.558***  1.559***  1.577***  1.559*** 
LTV_8 dummy  1.391***  1.39***  1.074***  1.395***  1.394***  1.391***  1.391***  1.398*** 
LTV_9 dummy  1.675***  1.674***  1.171***  1.681***  1.681***  1.675***  1.676***  1.66*** 
LTV_10 dummy  2.476***  2.474***  1.848***  2.481***  2.485***  2.476***  2.475***  2.46*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.486***  1.486***  1.479***  1.484***  1.389***  1.442***  1.485***  1.486*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.007  1.003  1.006  1.001  1.006  1.007  1.006  1.006 
Fees and Points  1.101***  1.101***  1.101***  1.101***  1.101***  1.101***  1.101***  1.101*** 
Interest Volatility  1.014***  1.014***  1.014***  1.014***  1.014***  1.014***  1.014***  1.014*** 
PVAR  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004*** 
HPG_1_8  6.437***  5.934***  5.281***  8.761***  6.149***  6.447***  6.441***  6.437*** 
HPG_lh_1  13.838***  12.425***  7.297***  18.785***  14.119***  13.864***  13.849***  13.835*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.181***  1.009  1.174***  1.181***  1.18***  1.152***  1.221***  1.175*** 
FICO_Q1*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.602***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.609***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.728***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.718***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.833***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.833***  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.245***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_lh_lh_1  -  -  2.3***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.399***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_lh_1  -  -  2.519***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.337***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_lh_1  -  -  2.026***  -  -  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  -  1.122***  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  -  0.962***  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.945***  - 
FICO_Q2* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.973***  - 
FICO_Q3* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.975**  - 
LTV_8*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.988 
LTV_9* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.022** 
LTV_10*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.014 
Low_Doc* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  1.069***  -  - 
PosUnempG*HPG_1_8  -  1.197***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
PosUnempG*HP_lh_1  -  1.27***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LR  702862  703414  707243  704884  703300  702978  702904  702883 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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ARM2  ARM3  Fixed 
Interactions of House Price Growth (HPG)  Default  Prepay.  Default  Prepay.  Default  Prepay. 
             
… with Credit Scores             
FICO in 4th Quartile and HPG > 8 (Baseline)             
FICO in 4th Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  8.761***  0.509***  9.138***  0.519***  8.73***  0.734*** 
FICO in 4th Quartile and HPG ≤ 1  18.785***  0.273***  23.028***  0.264***  25.18***  0.384*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and HPG > 8  1.806***  1.003  1.729***  1.021***  1.862***  1.036*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  13.181***  0.454***  13.994***  0.466***  14.635***  0.611*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and HPG ≤ 1  28.262***  0.222***  33.361***  0.241***  42.556***  0.28*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and HPG > 8  2.757***  0.986***  2.561***  1.019***  2.832***  1.042*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  17.581***  0.428***  17.667***  0.438***  18.501***  0.565*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and HPG ≤ 1  37.175***  0.217***  45.696***  0.201***  64.548***  0.218*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and HPG > 8  4.918***  0.97***  4.269***  1.010*  4.873***  1.032*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  25.925***  0.39***  24.771***  0.394***  26.819***  0.468*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile  and  HPG ≤ 1  56.303***  0.185***  71.657***  0.155***  110.661***  0.123*** 
             
             
… with Loan-to-Value Ratios             
LTV < 80 and HPG > 8 (Baseline)             
LTV < 80 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  5.281***  0.513***  6.035***  0.506***  5.979***  0.68*** 
LTV < 80 and HPG ≤ 1  7.297***  0.346***  12.633***  0.302***  18.458***  0.317*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and HPG > 8  1.074***  0.972***  1.121***  0.98***  1.144***  1.019*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  7.061***  0.429***  7.959***  0.434***  8.267***  0.552*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and HPG ≤ 1  18.021***  0.189***  24.431***  0.168***  33.999***  0.145*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and HPG > 8  1.171***  0.954***  1.261***  0.993  1.358***  0.998 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  8.655***  0.398***  9.756***  0.399***  10.484***  0.488*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and HPG ≤ 1  21.531***  0.171***  27.294***  0.165***  37.775***  0.142*** 
LTV ≥ 100 and HPG >8  1.848***  0.89***  1.774***  0.937***  1.965***  0.961*** 
LTV  ≥  100 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  13.044***  0.325***  13.976***  0.357***  14.586***  0.437*** 
LTV  ≥  100  and  HPG ≤ 1  27.324***  0.149***  35.122***  0.146***  41.115***  0.178*** 
             
             
… with Documentation             
Full Doc Loan and HPG > 8 (Baseline)             
Full Doc Loan and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  6.149***  0.463***  6.682***  0.457***  6.696***  0.601*** 
Full Doc Loan and HPG ≤ 1  14.119***  0.227***  19.123***  0.199***  24.763***  0.211*** 
Low Doc Loan and HPG > 8  1.389***  1.017***  1.317***  1.000  1.305***  0.977*** 
Low Doc Loan and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  9.584***  0.42***  10.258***  0.415***  9.349***  0.546*** 
Low Doc Loan and HPG ≤ 1  18.865***  0.219***  22.991***  0.216***  28.333***  0.248*** 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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ARM2  ARM3  Fixed 
Interactions of Unemployment Growth Dummy   Default  Prepay.  Default  Prepay.  Default  Prepay. 
             
…with House Price Growth             
NegUnempG and HPG > 8(Baseline)             
PosUnempG and HPG > 8  1.009  1.007***  0.94***  0.989**  1.004  1.007** 
NegUnempG and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  5.934***  0.461***  6.332***  0.458***  6.433***  0.594*** 
NegUnempG and HPG ≤ 1  12.425***  0.243***  16.318***  0.218***  22.012***  0.233*** 
PosUnempG and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  7.17***  0.423***  7.605***  0.418***  7.449***  0.585*** 
PosUnempG and HPG ≤ 1  15.918***  0.199***  20.709***  0.185***  27.061***  0.203*** 
             
             
…with Loan-to-Value Ratios             
LTV < 80 and NegUnempG(Baseline)             
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and NegUnempG  1.398***  0.886***  1.323***  0.906***  1.403***  0.889*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and NegUnempG  1.66***  0.845***  1.58***  0.879***  1.689***  0.839*** 
LTV ≥ 100 and NegUnempG  2.46***  0.74***  2.22***  0.808***  2.166***  0.805*** 
LTV < 80 and PosUnempG  1.175***  0.93***  1.124***  0.926***  1.126***  0.961*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and PosUnempG  1.624***  0.859***  1.545***  0.869***  1.53***  0.916*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and PosUnempG  1.993***  0.826***  1.86***  0.855***  2***  0.864*** 
LTV ≥ 100 and PosUnempG  2.934***  0.731***  2.624***  0.788***  2.891***  0.774*** 
             
             
…Credit Scores 
 
           
FICO in 4th Quartile and NegUnempG (Baseline)             
FICO in 3th Quartile and NegUnempG  1.577***  0.954***  1.56***  0.971***  1.734***  0.946*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and NegUnempG  2.15***  0.926***  2.048***  0.944***  2.287***  0.912*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and NegUnempG  3.328***  0.874***  2.99***  0.887***  3.515***  0.793*** 
FICO in 4th Quartile and PosUnempG  1.221***  0.951***  1.174***  0.94***  1.196***  0.957*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and PosUnempG  1.927***  0.908***  1.832***  0.912***  2.074***  0.905*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and PosUnempG  2.626***  0.881***  2.404***  0.887***  2.735***  0.873*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and PosUnempG  3.842***  0.849***  3.452***  0.858***  3.865***  0.832*** 
             
             
…Documentation             
Full Doc Loan and NegUnempG (Baseline)             
Full Doc Loan and PosUnempG  1.152***  0.959***  1.135***  0.951***  1.126***  0.989*** 
Low Doc Loan and NegUnempG  1.442***  0.972***  1.398***  0.966***  1.325***  0.95*** 
Low Doc Loan and PosUnempG  1.776***  0.942***  1.71***  0.928***  1.567***  0.954*** 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Hybrid-ARMs and the role of Securitization  
Determining the extent of securitization in the mortgage market can be a problem primarily because of the 
lack of a comprehensive data source. Nevertheless, the publication Inside MBS & ABS provides estimates of 
securitization trends in the U.S. for all market segments. Table A.1 provides their estimates of percentage securitized 
for Conforming (Prime) originations and that for the Subprime and Alt-A segments taken together. Table A.2 
provides the break-up by cohort (year of origination) for first lien subprime loans using data provided by the Lender 
Processing Services (LPS) database. This is the only comprehensive mortgage database that is known to distinguish 
between securitized and portfolio loans at the loan-level. Note that the split between the portfolio and securitized are 
different from the numbers quoted in Table 1. It is important to mention here that, although very large, the LPS 
database is not comprehensive, especially for subprime mortgages. For subprime loans, the more comprehensive 
data source is the Corelogic-LP data used in the paper (see GAO, 2010 for details). Therefore, for subprime 
mortgages, the estimates stated in Table A.1 are probably a better indicator on securitization rates.  
However, since the LPS data is known to include loan-level information about securitization, we can use it 
to determine the distribution of product varieties for securitized and portfolio loans. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the only prominent source from which we can get this information. However, it is an open question as to 
whether the trends in the LPS data are indicative of trends in the population of subprime loans. The distribution of 
subprime originations by product type is provided separately for securitized and portfolio loans in Table A.3.  
Prima facie evidence provides contradicting evidence on the causality between subprime securitization and 
subprime product variety. Over the period of our study, 1998-2006, both portfolio and securitized loans record 
significant increase in the proportion of hybrid-ARM products as a fraction of the total. Therefore, while it is true 
that the popularity of hybrid-ARM products coincided with the increased level of private-label securitization, a 
similar trend is observed also for non-securitized portfolio loans as well. Before 2000, Table A.3 reports that less 
than 5 percent of portfolio loans were ARM2 or ARM3 products. However, at the peak of the subprime 
securitization boom in 2005, over 63 percent of portfolio B & C grade loans originated were hybrid-ARM products. 
On the other hand, the demise of subprime securitization following the crisis in 2007 (Table 2) is accompanied by 
the complete disappearance of hybrid-ARM products. Clearly, linkages between securitization and product variety 
would be a fruitful avenue of research. At this time, however, we reserve our judgment on such linkages. It is 
perhaps safe to say that the emergence of hybrid-ARM products were not purely a securitization phenomenon.  
 
 
Additional Regression Results 
  First, we will provide a summary for the organization of tables. Our baseline regression is presented in 
Table 8. The covariates in Table 8 include house price growth since origination (Panel A) and year-on-year change 
in house prices (Panel B). The results are qualitatively similar.  Non-linearities in the relationship between 
covariates and default are examined in Table 9. We use dummies of credit and economic variables to examine non-
linearities in their relationship to default and prepayment. A list of these dummy variables is provided in Table 7. 
Next, we examine the effects of interactions in credit and economic variables on default and prepayment. The hazard 
ratios for the effects of these interactions are reported for house price growth (Table 11) and unemployment (Table 
12).  For example, column 1 in Table 11 and Table 12 presents the hazard ratios for default on ARM2 products for 
interactions with house price growth and unemployment respectively. The regression results used to calculate the 
ratios in column 1 are presented in Table 10. The additional regression results used to calculate the ratios in columns 
2-6 of Tables 11 and 12 are presented in this appendix as Tables 10A-E.  
This appendix also includes results that confirm that the results for the full sample also hold if we split the 
sample by cohort (year of origination). Table 8A presents the results of regressions similar to that in Table 8—
except it does so for ARM2 products by cohort. Notably the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in 
Table 8, demonstrating that what holds for the whole sample also holds for each cohort (year of origination).  
Results for default and prepayment by cohort for other products (ARM3 and FRM) are also similar and are 
presented in an Extended Appendix (pp 61-66).  Note that the covariates in Table 7A include House Price Growth 
(HPG) which measures the growth in house prices since origination. We also confirm that the results by cohort are 
similar when using year-on-year House Price Change (HPY) instead of HPG—these results are not presented here 
but available on request. Finally, Tables 11A and 12A present the results for ARM2 products by cohort of 
regressions similar to that in Table 11 and 12 respectively. Again, the results for the cohort are qualitatively similar 
to those for the whole sample. Lastly, the results for other products, namely ARM3 and FRM by cohort, are similar 
and available on request.   51 
 
Table A.1 Securitization Rates and Originations by Cohort (year of Origination) 
(Available since 2001 only; Dollars in Billion) 
                       2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Conforming 
                  Securitization Rate  72.32%  74.47%  77.74%  73.72%  80.50%  82.52%  91.39%  97.80%  93.40% 
MBS  Issuance  914.9  1,270.4  1,912.4  892.0  879.1  816.9  1,062.0  899.8  1,106.8 
Estimated Originations  1,265.0  1,706.0  2,460.0  1,210.0  1,092.0  990.0  1,162.0  920.0  1,185.0 
                    Subprime and Alt-A 
                  Securitization Rate  45.80%  66.00%  68.10%  72.90%  79.30%  81.40%  92.80%  2.90%  0.00% 
MBS  Issuance  $98.4  $176.1  $269.1  $521.1  $797.4  $814.3  $432.5  $1.9  $0.0 
Estimated Originations  $215.0  $267.0  $395.0  $715.0  $1,005.0  $1,000.0  $466.0  $64.0  $10.0 
Source: Inside MBS & ABS  





Table A.2 Distribution of Subprime Originations by Cohort (year of Origination) 
(as percentage of Total Number of Loans in last row ) 
 
First Mortgage, Grade B or C  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
FHLMC  0.24%  2.28%  0.88%  0.59%  0.38%  0.44%  1.50%  7.48%  3.75% 
FNMA  3.57%  14.77%  17.56%  20.79%  3.74%  2.61%  4.61%  11.15%  24.85% 
GNMA  0.13%  0.61%  0.89%  1.09%  0.72%  0.71%  0.51%  1.29%  27.45% 
Local Housing Authority  0.91%  0.80%  0.00%  0.00%  0.01%  0.34%  0.03%  0.91%  0.14% 
Portfolio  44.98%  37.76%  40.98%  32.16%  25.81%  47.46%  35.85%  44.80%  41.17% 
Private Securitized  49.76%  42.85%  38.87%  44.74%  68.77%  47.84%  56.99%  33.35%  0.33% 
Total Number of Loans  68411  71134  141884  368873  662365  908231  862455  387568  61511 
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS/McDash) 
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Table A.3 Distribution of Product Types of Subprime Originations by Cohort (year of Origination) 
(as percentage of Total Number of Loans in last row ) 
 
Private Securitized: First Mortgage, Grade B or C 
             2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
FRM  36.2%  58.7%  51.7%  44.1%  24.0%  22.1%  38.8%  57.2%  96.0% 
ARM2  16.5%  13.3%  14.9%  25.7%  33.4%  34.1%  28.4%  12.7%  0.5% 
ARM3  7.4%  5.6%  6.5%  16.3%  24.2%  11.8%  5.5%  3.5%  0.0% 
ARM5  0.1%  1.8%  6.7%  5.6%  0.7%  0.7%  1.4%  1.5%  1.0% 
ARM_Other  36.8%  15.9%  16.9%  6.0%  1.6%  6.0%  6.3%  11.5%  2.0% 
Other  3.0%  4.6%  3.2%  2.4%  16.0%  25.3%  19.7%  13.6%  0.5% 
Total Number of Loans  34043  30479  55144  165047  455530  434464  491532  129245  200 
                        Portfolio: First Mortgage, Grade B or C 
                 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
FRM  46.75%  24.54%  27.12%  42.85%  35.50%  22.96%  32.60%  66.34%  96.09% 
ARM2  3.06%  9.27%  10.53%  17.22%  40.42%  48.88%  44.39%  11.79%  0.00% 
ARM3  1.46%  1.35%  2.29%  3.26%  7.53%  13.98%  5.53%  3.88%  0.54% 
ARM5  0.55%  0.57%  0.57%  0.63%  1.72%  0.90%  3.25%  4.04%  1.03% 
ARM_Other  22.92%  57.95%  53.90%  33.94%  12.29%  1.77%  0.79%  0.50%  1.00% 
Other  25.26%  6.33%  5.58%  2.09%  2.54%  11.51%  13.43%  13.46%  1.33% 
Total Number of Loans  30770  26859  58140  118614  170936  431036  309180  173615  25325 
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS/McDash) 
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Table 8A: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by cohort (year of origination) for ARM2 products 
 
 Panel A: Default   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   0.705***  0.554***  0.557***  0.521***  0.487***  0.553***  0.633*** 
LTV   1.004***  1.015***  1.012***  1.019***  1.016***  1.029***  1.045*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.115***  1.269***  1.231***  1.363***  1.272***  1.432***  1.489*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.137***  1.077**  1.206***  0.974  1.048**  0.898***  0.74*** 
Fees and Points  1.143***  1.092***  1.043***  1.061***  1.144***  1.054***  0.957*** 
Interest Volatility  1.014***  1.022***  1.018***  0.992***  1.018***  1.104***  1.056*** 
PVAR  1***  1.001***  1.019***  1.031***  1.091***  1.124***  1.06*** 
House Price Growth  0.554***  0.618***  0.621***  0.741***  0.787***  0.815***  0.846*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.237***  1.76***  1.562***  1.287***  1.194***  1.276***  1.067*** 
LR  81998  84980  123383  168069  274234  352733  87331 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Prepayment   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   1.224***  1.225***  1.207***  1.215***  1.137***  1.17***  1.14*** 
LTV   0.995***  0.994***  0.996***  0.997***  0.995***  0.991***  0.986*** 
Low_Doc dummy  0.936***  0.932***  0.935***  0.962***  0.955***  0.92***  0.915*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.975  0.724***  0.779***  0.736***  0.753***  0.897***  0.742*** 
Fees and Points  1.066***  1.026***  1.007***  1.019***  1.038***  0.995***  0.982*** 
Interest Volatility  1.011***  1.011***  1.003***  0.991***  1.003***  1.018***  1.017*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.003***  1.014***  1.022***  1.059***  1.062***  1.044*** 
House Price Growth  1.303***  1.125***  1.086***  1.117***  1.163***  1.154***  1.16*** 
PosUnempG dummy  0.817***  0.796***  1.039***  0.945***  0.918***  0.892***  1.123*** 
LR  79054  73430  137416  389744  798797  620020  78771 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively. 
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Table 10A: Prepayment Hazard Ratios for ARM2 products 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
FICO_Q1  0.882***  0.883***  0.889***  0.97***  0.882***  0.882***  0.874***  0.883*** 
FICO_Q2  0.93***  0.93***  0.94***  0.986***  0.929***  0.93***  0.926***  0.93*** 
FICO_Q3  0.961***  0.961***  0.968***  1.003  0.961***  0.961***  0.954***  0.961*** 
LTV_8  0.903***  0.903***  0.972***  0.905***  0.903***  0.903***  0.903***  0.886*** 
LTV_9  0.864***  0.865***  0.954***  0.866***  0.864***  0.864***  0.864***  0.845*** 
LTV_10  0.761***  0.761***  0.89***  0.759***  0.761***  0.761***  0.761***  0.74*** 
Low_Doc  0.977***  0.977***  0.978***  0.976***  1.017***  0.972***  0.977***  0.977*** 
Prep. Penalty  0.763***  0.766***  0.77***  0.761***  0.764***  0.764***  0.764***  0.763*** 
Interest Volatility  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004*** 
PVAR  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004*** 
Fees and Points  1.05***  1.05***  1.05***  1.05***  1.05***  1.05***  1.05***  1.05*** 
HPG_1_8  0.445***  0.461***  0.513***  0.509***  0.463***  0.445***  0.445***  0.445*** 
HPG_lh_1  0.223***  0.243***  0.346***  0.273***  0.227***  0.223***  0.223***  0.223*** 
PosUnempG  0.963***  1.007***  0.968***  0.963***  0.962***  0.959***  0.951***  0.93*** 
FICO_Q1*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.789***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.699***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.853***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.808***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.89***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.811***  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.861***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_lh_lh_1  -  -  0.561***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.813***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_lh_1  -  -  0.518***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.712***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_lh_1  -  -  0.482***  -  -  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  -  0.89***  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  -  0.948***  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.022***  - 
FICO_Q2* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.009**  - 
FICO_Q3* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.013***  - 
Low_Doc* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  1.01***  -  - 
LTV_8*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.043*** 
LTV_9* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.051*** 
LTV_10*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.061*** 
PosUnempG*HPG_1_8  -  0.913***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
PosUnempG*HP_lh_1  -  0.812***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LR  1448270  1450005  1463141  1453533  1450091  1448285  1448312  1448608 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 10B: Default Hazard Ratios for ARM3 products 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
FICO_Q1   2.97***  2.969***  2.956***  4.269***  2.972***  2.971***  2.99***  2.971*** 
FICO_Q2   2.038***  2.037***  2.029***  2.561***  2.037***  2.039***  2.048***  2.038*** 
FICO_Q3   1.557***  1.557***  1.553***  1.729***  1.556***  1.558***  1.56***  1.558*** 
LTV_8   1.342***  1.342***  1.121***  1.347***  1.347***  1.342***  1.342***  1.323*** 
LTV_9   1.609***  1.607***  1.261***  1.617***  1.616***  1.608***  1.609***  1.58*** 
LTV_10   2.265***  2.261***  1.774***  2.279***  2.276***  2.264***  2.265***  2.22*** 
Low_Doc  1.444***  1.443***  1.442***  1.446***  1.317***  1.398***  1.443***  1.443*** 
Prep. Penalty   1.039  1.036  1.037  1.037  1.036  1.04*  1.039  1.038 
Fees and Points  1.116***  1.116***  1.116***  1.116***  1.116***  1.116***  1.116***  1.116*** 
Interest Volatility  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003*** 
HPG_1_8  7.051***  6.332***  6.035***  9.138***  6.682***  7.062***  7.053***  7.051*** 
HPG_lh_1  18.55***  16.318***  12.633***  23.028***  19.123***  18.587***  18.554***  18.542*** 
PosUnempG  1.162***  0.94***  1.157***  1.16***  1.159***  1.135***  1.174***  1.124*** 
FICO_Q1*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.635***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.729***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.755***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.775***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.886***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.838***  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.177***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_lh_lh_1  -  -  1.726***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.282***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_lh_1  -  -  1.713***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.306***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_lh_1  -  -  1.567***  -  -  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  -  1.165***  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  -  0.913***  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.984  - 
FICO_Q2* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.988  - 
FICO_Q3* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.996  - 
LTV_8*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.039** 
LTV_9* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.047** 
LTV_10*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.052** 
Low_Doc* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  1.077***  -  - 
PosUnempG*HPG_1_8  -  1.278***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
PosUnempG*HP_lh_1  -  1.35***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LR  145356  145513  145681  145670  145506  145379  145356  145363 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 10C: Prepayment Hazard Ratios for ARM3 products 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
FICO_Q1  0.899***  0.899***  0.903***  1.01*  0.898***  0.899***  0.887***  0.899*** 
FICO_Q2  0.95***  0.951***  0.958***  1.019***  0.95***  0.95***  0.944***  0.951*** 
FICO_Q3  0.978***  0.978***  0.983***  1.021***  0.978***  0.978***  0.971***  0.978*** 
LTV_8  0.92***  0.92***  0.98***  0.923***  0.92***  0.92***  0.92***  0.906*** 
LTV_9  0.898***  0.899***  0.993  0.9***  0.898***  0.898***  0.899***  0.879*** 
LTV_10  0.827***  0.828***  0.937***  0.825***  0.827***  0.827***  0.827***  0.808*** 
Low_Doc  0.971***  0.971***  0.971***  0.971***  1.000  0.966***  0.971***  0.971*** 
Prep. Penalty  0.765***  0.766***  0.767***  0.765***  0.766***  0.765***  0.765***  0.765*** 
Fees and Points  1.057***  1.057***  1.057***  1.057***  1.057***  1.057***  1.057***  1.057*** 
Interest Volatility  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004*** 
PVAR  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004***  1.004*** 
HPG_1_8  0.443***  0.458***  0.506***  0.519***  0.457***  0.444***  0.443***  0.443*** 
HPG_lh_1  0.204***  0.218***  0.302***  0.264***  0.199***  0.204***  0.204***  0.204*** 
PosUnempG  0.954***  0.989**  0.959***  0.954***  0.954***  0.951***  0.94***  0.926*** 
FICO_Q1*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.751***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.581***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.827***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.747***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.878***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.894***  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.876***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_lh_lh_1  -  -  0.566***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.795***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_lh_1  -  -  0.551***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.753***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_lh_1  -  -  0.516***  -  -  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  -  0.908***  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  -  1.084***  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.028***  - 
FICO_Q2* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.014*  - 
FICO_Q3* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.015*  - 
LTV_8*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.037*** 
LTV_9* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.05*** 
LTV_10*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.053*** 
Low_Doc* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  1.011*  -  - 
PosUnempG*HPG_1_8  -  0.924***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
PosUnempG*HP_lh_1  -  0.856***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LR  392735  392938  394936  394417  393019  392738  392748  392792 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 10D: Default Hazard Ratios for FRM products 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
FICO_Q1  3.403***  3.401***  3.393***  4.873***  3.4***  3.404***  3.515***  3.407*** 
FICO_Q2  2.261***  2.259***  2.254***  2.832***  2.259***  2.261***  2.287***  2.262*** 
FICO_Q3  1.709***  1.708***  1.707***  1.862***  1.708***  1.709***  1.734***  1.71*** 
LTV_8  1.386***  1.386***  1.144***  1.391***  1.388***  1.386***  1.386***  1.403*** 
LTV_9  1.719***  1.718***  1.358***  1.729***  1.721***  1.718***  1.719***  1.689*** 
LTV_10  2.332***  2.329***  1.965***  2.346***  2.332***  2.333***  2.329***  2.166*** 
Low_Doc  1.351***  1.351***  1.35***  1.356***  1.305***  1.325***  1.351***  1.352*** 
Prep. Penalty  1.166***  1.166***  1.165***  1.165***  1.166***  1.166***  1.166***  1.164*** 
Fees and Points  1.115***  1.115***  1.115***  1.115***  1.115***  1.115***  1.115***  1.115*** 
Interest Volatility  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003*** 
HPG_1_8  6.823***  6.433***  5.979***  8.73***  6.696***  6.83***  6.834***  6.831*** 
HPG_lh_1  23.936***  22.012***  18.458***  25.18***  24.763***  23.971***  23.978***  23.886*** 
PosUnempG  1.142***  1.004  1.141***  1.142***  1.141***  1.126***  1.196***  1.126*** 
FICO_Q1*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.63***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.902***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.748***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.905***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.9***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.908**  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.209***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_lh_lh_1  -  -  1.61***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.291***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_lh_1  -  -  1.507***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_1_8  -  -  1.241***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_lh_1  -  -  1.133***  -  -  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  -  1.07***  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  -  0.877***  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.92***  - 
FICO_Q2* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.972  - 
FICO_Q3* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.965*  - 
LTV_8*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.969** 
LTV_9* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.052*** 
LTV_10*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.186*** 
Low_Doc* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  1.05***  -  - 
PosUnempG*HPG_1_8  -  1.153***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
PosUnempG*HP_lh_1  -  1.225***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LR  268049  268131  268478  268692  268149  268064  268078  268139 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 10E: Prepayment Hazard Ratios for FRM products 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
FICO_Q1  0.825***  0.825***  0.827***  1.032***  0.825***  0.825***  0.793***  0.825*** 
FICO_Q2  0.929***  0.929***  0.938***  1.042***  0.93***  0.929***  0.912***  0.93*** 
FICO_Q3  0.961***  0.961***  0.966***  1.036***  0.962***  0.961***  0.946***  0.961*** 
LTV_8  0.917***  0.917***  1.019***  0.921***  0.917***  0.917***  0.918***  0.889*** 
LTV_9  0.864***  0.865***  0.998  0.867***  0.864***  0.864***  0.864***  0.839*** 
LTV_10  0.805***  0.806***  0.961***  0.801***  0.805***  0.805***  0.805***  0.805*** 
Low_Doc  0.957***  0.956***  0.957***  0.957***  0.977***  0.95***  0.957***  0.956*** 
Prep. Penalty  0.851***  0.851***  0.854***  0.853***  0.851***  0.851***  0.851***  0.851*** 
Fees and Points  1.059***  1.059***  1.059***  1.06***  1.059***  1.059***  1.059***  1.059*** 
Interest Volatility  1.005***  1.005***  1.005***  1.005***  1.005***  1.005***  1.005***  1.005*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003***  1.003*** 
HPG_1_8  0.589***  0.594***  0.68***  0.734***  0.601***  0.589***  0.589***  0.589*** 
HPG_lh_1  0.22***  0.233***  0.317***  0.384***  0.211***  0.221***  0.22***  0.22*** 
PosUnempG  0.994***  1.007**  0.999  0.994***  0.994***  0.989***  0.957***  0.961*** 
FICO_Q1*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.618***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.311***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.738***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q2*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.543***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  0.803***  -  -  -  - 
FICO_Q3*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  0.702***  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.797***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_8*HPG_lh_lh_1  -  -  0.449***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.72***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_9*HPG_lh_1  -  -  0.449***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_1_8  -  -  0.669***  -  -  -  -  - 
LTV_10*HPG_lh_1  -  -  0.585***  -  -  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_1_8  -  -  -  -  0.931***  -  -  - 
Low_Doc*HPG_lh_1  -  -  -  -  1.204***  -  -  - 
FICO_Q1* UnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.096***  - 
FICO_Q2* UnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.042***  - 
FICO_Q3* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.035***  - 
LTV_8*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.072*** 
LTV_9* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.072*** 
LTV_10*PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.001 
Low_Doc* PosUnempG  -  -  -  -  -  1.015***  -  - 
PosUnempG*HPG_1_8  -  0.977***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
PosUnempG*HP_lh_1  -  0.868***  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LR  807285  807389  814218  816633  807690  807296  807536  807575 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.    59 
Table 11A: Default Hazard Ratios for interactions of House Price Growth with credit variables by year for ARM2 products 
 
Interactions of House Price Growth (HPG)  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
               
… with Credit Scores               
FICO in 4th Quartile and HPG > 8 (Baseline)               
FICO in 4th Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  13.903***  10.575***  11.75***  12.145***  8.272***  8.186***  11.517*** 
FICO in 4th Quartile and HPG ≤ 1  23.493***  39.76***  82.483***  26.395***  10.595***  13.759***  25.255*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and HPG > 8  1.499***  1.46***  1.605***  1.723***  1.639***  1.588***  1.277** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  19.706***  15.928***  17.851***  17.534***  11.835***  11.278***  14.662*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and HPG ≤ 1  54.209***  68.388***  110.059***  39.209***  15.531***  18.107***  31.779*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and HPG > 8  1.887***  1.828***  2.232***  2.489***  2.37***  2.302***  2.107*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  24.82***  19.881***  22.719***  22.538***  16.018***  14.055***  17.544*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and HPG ≤ 1  101.131***  100.493***  136.253***  57.428***  22.084***  21.847***  35.512*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and HPG > 8  2.901***  2.855***  3.472***  4.175***  4.21***  3.997***  3.292*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  34.311***  30.153***  32.092***  30.339***  22.288***  18.628***  23.753*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile  and  HPG ≤ 1  151.311***  127.633***  198.175***  67.663***  30.36***  26.621***  43.841*** 
               
… with Loan-to-Value Ratios               
LTV < 80 and HPG > 8 (Baseline)               
LTV < 80 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  11.387***  10.909***  9.609***  7.363***  5.236***  4.297***  5.702*** 
LTV < 80 and HPG ≤ 1  51.754***  42.393***  61.11***  14.504***  6.117***  4.849***  8.101*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and HPG > 8  0.96  1.222***  1.182***  1.093***  1.066***  1.144***  1.323** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  12.583***  13.03***  11.964***  9.356***  6.938***  7.528***  11.989*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and HPG ≤ 1  47.789***  63.589***  73.739***  21.694***  9.148***  12.668***  26.406*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and HPG > 8  0.999  1.3***  1.19***  1.148***  1.084***  1.25***  1.584*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  13.063***  14.508***  12.956***  11.861***  8.454***  9.444***  16.13*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and HPG ≤ 1  55.923***  68.514***  76.51***  27.406***  12.217***  16.17***  38.547*** 
LTV ≥ 100 and HPG >8  1.893***  2.949***  1.914***  1.485***  1.534***  1.889***  2.397*** 
LTV  ≥  100 and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  25.557***  20.679***  17.065***  14.661***  10.456***  12.367***  24.058*** 
LTV  ≥  100  and  HPG ≤ 1  51.031***  61.666***  100.515***  38.699***  13.564***  19.606***  50.248*** 
               
… with Documentation               
Full Doc Loan and HPG > 8 (Baseline)               
Full Doc Loan and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  12.673***  10.856***  9.949***  8.609***  6.223***  6.063***  8.972*** 
Full Doc Loan and HPG ≤ 1  55.791***  50.519***  65.013***  21.013***  8.648***  9.704***  19.085*** 
Low Doc Loan and HPG > 8  1.198***  1.3***  1.199***  1.346***  1.2***  1.386***  1.428*** 
Low Doc Loan and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  14.416***  13.774***  12.473***  12.092***  8.272***  8.76***  13.462*** 
Low Doc Loan and HPG ≤ 1  40.562***  48.151***  63.941***  23.953***  10.358***  13.44***  27.314*** 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.      60 
Table 12A: Default Hazard Ratios for interactions of Unemployment with credit variables and House Price Growth by year for ARM2 products 
 
Interactions of Unemployment Growth Dummy   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
               
…with House Price Growth               
NegUnempG and HPG > 8 (Baseline)               
PosUnempG and HPG > 8  1.372***  2.104***  1.784***  1.286***  0.979  0.981  0.94 
NegUnempG and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  13.41***  13.984***  11.221***  9.25***  6.713***  5.657***  8.651*** 
NegUnempG and HPG ≤ 1  49.875***  59.013***  56.461***  15.668***  4.852***  8.863***  18.198*** 
PosUnempG and  1 < HPG ≤ 8  15.761***  18.358***  16.235***  11.326***  6.994***  6.731***  10.224*** 
PosUnempG and HPG ≤ 1  85.318***  90.738***  133.21***  33.791***  13.72***  10.541***  20.286*** 
               
…with Loan-to-Value Ratios               
LTV < 80 and Neg. Unemp. Gr. (Baseline)               
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and NegUnempG  1.084***  1.285***  1.233***  1.217***  1.191***  1.642***  2.434*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and NegUnempG  1.112***  1.466***  1.336***  1.492***  1.391***  2.046***  3.355*** 
LTV ≥ 100 and NegUnempG  2.091***  1.94***  1.743***  1.845***  1.687***  2.694***  5.021*** 
LTV < 80 and PosUnempG  1.203***  1.581***  1.581***  1.285***  0.998  1.119***  1.097*** 
80 ≤ LTV < 90 and PosUnempG  1.297***  1.784***  1.945***  1.586***  1.258***  1.93***  2.99*** 
90 ≤ LTV < 100 and PosUnempG  1.417***  1.848***  2.039***  1.912***  1.498***  2.364***  4.17*** 
LTV ≥ 100 and PosUnempG  2.617***  2.557***  2.898***  2.472***  1.961***  3.11***  5.442*** 
               
…Credit Scores 
 
             
FICO in 4th Quartile and NegUnempG (Baseline)               
FICO in 3th Quartile and NegUnempG  1.482***  1.551***  1.551***  1.607***  1.526***  1.41***  1.295*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and NegUnempG  1.884***  1.972***  2.052***  2.146***  2.181***  1.794***  1.494*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and NegUnempG  2.68***  2.868***  2.911***  3.025***  3.309***  2.523***  2.004*** 
FICO in 4th Quartile and PosUnempG  1.334***  1.434***  1.7***  1.423***  1.164***  1.187***  1.199*** 
FICO in 3th Quartile and PosUnempG  1.978***  2.225***  2.636***  2.287***  1.776***  1.674***  1.552*** 
FICO in 2nd Quartile and PosUnempG  2.514***  2.828***  3.488***  3.054***  2.539***  2.13***  1.791*** 
FICO in Bottom Quartile and PosUnempG  3.169***  4.131***  4.533***  3.861***  3.382***  2.804***  2.211*** 
               
…Documentation               
Full Doc Loan and NegUnempG (Baseline)               
Full Doc Loan and PosUnempG  1.188***  1.353***  1.498***  1.257***  1.052***  1.136***  1.113*** 
Low Doc Loan and NegUnempG  1.082***  1.17***  1.127***  1.296***  1.238***  1.399***  1.438*** 
Low Doc Loan and PosUnempG  1.417***  1.84***  2.004***  1.801***  1.386***  1.644***  1.689*** 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 8B: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by cohort (year of origination) for ARM3 products 
 
 Panel A: Default   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   0.68***  0.646***  0.587***  0.511***  0.502***  0.562***  0.569*** 
LTV   1.007***  1.013***  1.014***  1.019***  1.017***  1.03***  1.046*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.148***  1.242***  1.224***  1.407***  1.385***  1.512***  1.592*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.174***  0.73***  1.175**  0.629***  0.802***  0.993  1.017 
Fees and Points  1.142***  1.089***  1.049***  1.086***  1.133***  1.058***  0.956*** 
Interest Volatility  1.015***  1.022***  1.014***  1.002***  1.028***  1.098***  1.058*** 
PVAR  1.001***  1.002***  1.021***  1.037***  1.094***  1.117***  1.056*** 
House Price Growth  0.54***  0.6***  0.605***  0.735***  0.758***  0.78***  0.809*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.237***  1.746***  1.426***  1.212***  1.079***  1.228***  1.16*** 
LR  28685  23650  29732  33877  51958  47428  11577 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Prepayment   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   1.188***  1.221***  1.158***  1.139***  1.09***  1.174***  1.156*** 
LTV   0.996***  0.995***  0.997***  0.998***  0.995***  0.991***  0.988*** 
Low_Doc dummy  0.974*  0.95***  0.97***  0.972***  0.975***  0.911***  0.935*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.881***  0.894***  0.956*  0.632***  0.754***  0.79***  0.761*** 
Fees and Points  1.063***  1.021***  1.01***  1.03***  1.039***  1.003***  0.981*** 
Interest Volatility  1.011***  1.01***  1.003***  0.996***  1.005***  1.02***  1.02*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.003***  1.015***  1.026***  1.063***  1.072***  1.042*** 
House Price Growth  1.296***  1.112***  1.107***  1.141***  1.156***  1.154***  1.15*** 
PosUnempG dummy  0.799***  0.833***  0.967***  0.89***  0.884***  0.909***  1.178*** 
LR  25413  15590  32847  85999  187254  101862  12533 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively. 
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Table 8C: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by cohort (year of origination) for FRM products 
 
 Panel A: Default   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   0.527***  0.586***  0.504***  0.519***  0.465***  0.517***  0.45*** 
LTV   1.012***  1.012***  1.017***  1.02***  1.021***  1.027***  1.043*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.232***  1.181***  1.262***  1.354***  1.349***  1.409***  1.599*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.060*  0.993  1.284***  1.203***  1.225***  1.201***  1.694*** 
Fees and Points  1.159***  1.095***  1.046***  1.078***  1.13***  1.051***  0.957*** 
Interest Volatility  1.018***  1.022***  1.015***  1.005***  1.022***  1.100***  1.06*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.003***  1.02***  1.038***  1.079***  1.122***  1.056*** 
House Price Growth  0.855***  0.566***  0.619***  0.721***  0.76***  0.802***  0.791*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.138***  1.477***  1.468***  1.295***  0.996  1.028  1.109*** 
LR  33662  45171  44132  60445  51548  37125  11924 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Prepayment   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   1.41***  1.241***  1.157***  1.126***  1.101***  1.148***  1.129*** 
LTV   0.994***  0.995***  0.998***  0.997***  0.997***  0.993***  0.991*** 
Low_Doc dummy  0.928***  0.955***  0.966***  0.945***  0.97***  0.926***  0.95*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.94***  0.923***  1.063***  0.856***  0.834***  0.807***  0.735*** 
Fees and Points  1.041***  1.031***  1.019***  1.032***  1.048***  1.002***  0.975*** 
Interest Volatility  1.007***  1.01***  1.004***  0.996***  1.004***  1.024***  1.025*** 
PVAR  1.002***  1.003***  1.016***  1.034***  1.068***  1.077***  1.048*** 
House Price Growth  1.000***  1.05***  1.081***  1.162***  1.161***  1.142***  1.102*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.000  0.976***  1.108***  0.916***  0.902***  0.914***  1.165*** 
LR  33649  42129  75327  220160  207246  95469  14817 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively. 
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Table 8A.1: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by cohort (year of origination) for ARM2 products 
 
 Panel A: Default   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   0.514***  0.475***  0.477***  0.47***  0.454***  0.527***  0.625*** 
LTV   1.01***  1.016***  1.015***  1.021***  1.019***  1.03***  1.045*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.182***  1.288***  1.284***  1.405***  1.291***  1.473***  1.554*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.238***  1.047  1.276***  0.992  1.013  0.923***  0.777*** 
Fees and Points  1.157***  1.112***  1.044***  1.053***  1.127***  1.041***  0.956*** 
Interest Volatility  1.013***  1.025***  1.021***  0.99***  1.01***  1.098***  1.05*** 
PVAR  1***  1.001***  1.023***  1.045***  1.104***  1.156***  1.072*** 
House Price Growth  0.936***  0.929***  0.945***  0.993***  1.03***  0.998***  1.006*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.11***  1.084***  1.379***  1.093***  0.954***  0.863***  1.319*** 
LR  50148  52069  65214  110271  197705  288569  75981 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Prepayment   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   1.351***  1.294***  1.242***  1.245***  1.24***  1.239***  1.173*** 
LTV   0.994***  0.994***  0.996***  0.997***  0.995***  0.989***  0.985*** 
Low_Doc dummy  0.927***  0.933***  0.931***  0.953***  0.943***  0.896***  0.886*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.944***  0.754***  0.779***  0.748***  0.785***  0.899***  0.766*** 
Fees and Points  1.036***  1.018***  1.009***  1.016***  1.025***  1  0.987*** 
Interest Volatility  1.007***  1.008***  1.002***  0.992***  1.001***  1.011***  1.013*** 
PVAR  1.001***  1.001***  1.01***  1.014***  1.036***  1.03***  1.031*** 
House Price Growth  1  0.983***  0.994***  1.035***  1.065***  1.061***  1.074*** 
PosUnempG dummy  0.991  1.113***  1.145***  1.033***  0.919***  0.977***  1.068*** 
LR  41357  55826  115931  268947  516422  393532  64663 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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Table 8B.1: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by cohort (year of origination) for ARM3 products 
 
 Panel A: Default   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   0.489***  0.482***  0.435***  0.447***  0.419***  0.489***  0.439*** 
LTV   1.013***  1.017***  1.02***  1.024***  1.021***  1.026***  1.042*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.254***  1.206***  1.307***  1.411***  1.399***  1.44***  1.629*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.074**  1.05  1.24***  1.145***  1.289***  1.231***  1.763*** 
Fees and Points  1.163***  1.118***  1.049***  1.069***  1.118***  1.042***  0.953*** 
Interest Volatility  1.018***  1.024***  1.017***  1.001***  1.014***  1.094***  1.056*** 
PVAR  1.003***  1.004***  1.025***  1.05***  1.094***  1.15***  1.066*** 
House Price Growth  0.931***  0.923***  0.959***  1.006***  1.031***  1.011***  0.985*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.113***  1.109***  1.303***  1.04**  0.934***  1.024  1.275*** 
LR  32775  28445  26169  42323  38386  30736  9941 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Prepayment   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   1.411***  1.264***  1.189***  1.172***  1.197***  1.213***  1.154*** 
LTV   0.994***  0.995***  0.998***  0.997***  0.997***  0.993***  0.99*** 
Low_Doc dummy  0.929***  0.961***  0.961***  0.938***  0.956***  0.909***  0.938*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.94***  0.934***  1.077***  0.872***  0.829***  0.831***  0.722*** 
Fees and Points  1.041***  1.029***  1.018***  1.026***  1.034***  1.004***  0.978*** 
Interest Volatility  1.007***  1.009***  1.004***  0.996***  1.001***  1.018***  1.02*** 
PVAR  1.002***  1.002***  1.014***  1.024***  1.049***  1.046***  1.04*** 
House Price Growth  0.996***  0.985***  1.007***  1.047***  1.07***  1.062***  1.072*** 
PosUnempG dummy  1.005  1.095***  1.192***  1.04***  0.913***  0.949***  1.134*** 
LR  33605  38206  68300  168993  156916  70879  14145 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively. 
     66 
Table 8C.1: Default and Prepayment Hazard Ratios by cohort (year of origination) for FRM products 
 
 Panel A: Default   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   0.508***  0.537***  0.519***  0.472***  0.463***  0.532***  0.548*** 
LTV   1.012***  1.016***  1.018***  1.023***  1.017***  1.03***  1.047*** 
Low_Doc dummy  1.207***  1.239***  1.334***  1.425***  1.383***  1.541***  1.656*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  1.358***  0.663***  1.198***  0.677***  0.891*  1.035  0.978 
Fees and Points  1.156***  1.111***  1.05***  1.078***  1.121***  1.044***  0.953*** 
Interest Volatility  1.015***  1.025***  1.016***  0.999*  1.017***  1.092***  1.051*** 
PVAR  1.001***  1.002***  1.025***  1.05***  1.107***  1.153***  1.067*** 
House Price Growth  0.934***  0.911***  0.953***  1.007***  1.032***  1.009***  1.004 
PosUnempG dummy  1.059**  1.132***  1.247***  1.008  0.886***  0.973  1.362*** 
LR  17601  14653  16316  23535  35971  36698  9781 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Prepayment   
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
FICO (scaled)   1.307***  1.269***  1.19***  1.171***  1.164***  1.24***  1.186*** 
LTV   0.995***  0.996***  0.997***  0.997***  0.995***  0.99***  0.987*** 
Low_Doc dummy  0.946***  0.952***  0.952***  0.965***  0.966***  0.89***  0.909*** 
Prep. Penalty dummy  0.842***  0.913**  0.919***  0.61***  0.786***  0.798***  0.777*** 
Fees and Points  1.035***  1.016***  1.011***  1.022***  1.027***  1.006***  0.986*** 
Interest Volatility  1.007***  1.007***  1.003***  0.996***  1.002***  1.014***  1.016*** 
PVAR  1.001***  1.002***  1.011***  1.017***  1.042***  1.039***  1.03*** 
House Price Growth  0.996***  0.981***  1.002***  1.044***  1.062***  1.059***  1.072*** 
PosUnempG dummy  0.998  1.165***  1.092***  1.002  0.91***  0.96***  1.123*** 
LR  13783  12305  26850  60734  130934  66246  10715 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively. 
 